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In contemporary scientific discourse, creative thinking is seen as arising from a 
medley of normative cognitive processes that are not exclusive to highly creative 
people.  
Following this modern continuum-based view, one functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study and one event-related potential (ERP) study, implementing a 
novel task design, were carried out to investigate the neural correlates of conceptual 
expansion, acritical facet of creative thinking. Conceptual expansion is one of the 
core processes in the invention of creative ideas and describes the ability to widen 
the boundaries of existing semantic concepts beyond conventional limits. The new 
task design used a modified version of the alternate uses task and required subjects 
to rate a given object and a described use for this object into one of three possible 
categories: High-unusual and low-appropriate (nonsense), low-unusual and high-
appropriate (common), and high-unusual and high-appropriate (creative). Brain 
activation during trials rated as high-unusual and high-appropriate (creative) 
reflected conceptual expansion processing and were contrasted with trials reflecting 
pure novelty processing (nonsense object-use combinations) or appropriateness 
processing (creative and common uses) 
As hypothesized, the fMRI results showed conceptual expansion related activation in 
a semantic and conceptual integration network comprising the frontopolar cortex, 
anterior inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex and the temporal poles.  
The ERP study investigated whether conceptual expansion related activation could 
be observed in the N400-time window. Results showed a post-N400 effect, 
differentiating conceptual expansion specific processing from the processing of mere 
novelty or appropriateness, implicating semantic integration brain mechanisms. 
Both studies together led to the uncovering of relevant brain networks and cerebral 
time flow of conceptual expansion processing. These studies illustrate a new and 
viable approach by which to investigate predefined facets of creative thinking using 
neuroscientific methods, which allowed for more consistent and specific results to 
surface compared to prior creativity research. 




1 General Introduction  
Creativity is one of the most fascinating human cognitive abilities. It is the foundation 
that enables the emergence of innovative power and cultural progress of human 
societies.  
The creativity concept has undergone a long history of development starting with the 
earliest mystical concepts about geniuses being vessels of the divine spirit, to the 
beginning of separation of the genius from the supernatural in the Renaissance, to 
Galton´s first attempts to measure individual differences using empirical methods. 
But it was not until Joy Paul Guilford´s APA Presidential Address (Guilford, 1950) 
that the research focus slowly shifted away from the investigation of extraordinarily 
gifted people with remarkable social achievements to the investigation of creative 
thinking in ordinary individuals (Albert & Runco, 1999). Different research 
approaches were developed to get a grasp on this topic, each with its own 
advantages and disadvantages. However, despite being a fascinating ability, 
creativity often did not receive the same attention as other constructs like intelligence 
or memory, for example. Although Guilford managed to greatly strengthen this 
research area, it nonetheless remained a marginal research topic in psychology 
(Guilford, 1950). 
 
1.1 Creativity - Conceptualization 
One of the reasons for this lack of research impetus was likely the immense 
complexity of the topic, which is evidenced by the fact that one can investigate 
creativity from many different perspectives (Rhodes, 1961). It is possible to examine 
the factors that define a person or a product to be creative, the process of being 
creative, the neurophysiological correlates of creative thinking, or, for example, 
environmental factors such as the sociocultural context in which creativity takes 
place. The fact that many researchers look from many different angles on creativity 
tells us that the construct is heterogeneous and complex. 
This leads to another problem, that such a construct is easily confounded with other 
factors. For example, the fine arts are sometimes regarded as the home of creative 
production and many artists are widely admired and eventually become historical 




prominent persons. It is the field of arts from which creativity got most of its mystical 
and fascinating glamour. But a stricter consideration could come to the conclusion 
that art has much more to do with extraordinary skill rather than originality or creative 
thinking (Abraham, 2012). A pianist for example shines through because of his 
remarkable piano skills. Proficiency is the basis for being an artist.  
Another example is the historical confounding of creativity with intelligence. Joy Paul 
Guilford stated “Some of you will undoubtedly feel that the subject of creative genius 
has not been as badly neglected as I have indicated, because of the common belief 
that genius is largely a matter of intelligence and the IQ” (Guilford, 1950). Creativity 
and intelligence are often positive correlated and a threshold-effect stating that 
creativity and intelligence are positive correlated only to the extent of normal levels of 
intelligence has been discussed in detail (Benedek et al., 2014). A good example for 
the obvious possibility of a confound between creativity and intelligence is the 
domain of problem solving. Certain solutions to problems are regarded as a new and 
appropriate, and they are therefore classified as creative. But it is hard to imagine 
that the process of problem solving has nothing to do with intelligence, regardless of 
whether the solution calls for creativity or not. 
Given such difficulties one could be led to believe that creativity cannot exactly be 
defined. Nonetheless, over the course of several decades, the research community 
has agreed upon a product based working definition of creativity. This definition 
states that a creative product has to be novel and appropriate (Runco & Jaeger, 
2012; Stein, 1953). Many different words are exchangeably used for the two defining 
characteristics of creative products in the literature, such as original, statistically rare, 
unique or new instead of novel, or significant, utilizable, applicable, relevant or fitting 
instead of appropriate. 
Despite this seemingly straightforward definition, different research approaches such 
as the psychometric approach, the neuroscientific approach or the biographical 
approach (Mayer, 1999), and different methodologies adopted within each of these 
approaches has resulted in a myriad of findings, which often seem unlinked and are 
challenging to integrate into a common theoretical framework (Abraham, 2013a). 
The emergence of newer neuroscientific techniques like functional and structural 
neuroimaging has resulted in even more scattered and unclear results over the past 




15 years. Difficulties in examining creativity in an artificial and unspontaneous 
laboratory environment certainly contribute to this high diversity of results.  
The current doctoral project focused on a specific cognitive process that is called 
upon during creative thinking. In doing so, creative cognition approach (Finke et al., 
1992; Smith et al., 1995) using two different neuroscientific methods (functional 
magnetic resonance imaging and electroencephalography) was employed. The 
following sections will give an overview of the most prominent cognitive theories, 
cognitive processes and neuroscientific findings related to creative thinking, as well 
as a short introduction to these neuroscientific techniques. 
 
1.2 Cognitive Theories - From past to present 
J.P Guilford´s work on creativity and especially his APA Presidential Address were a 
turning point in the history of creativity research in multiple respects. He tackled 
many questions that are still discussed today and blazed a trail for the empirical 
investigation of individual differences regarding creative thinking. He argued for a 
separation of creativity from intelligence testing, conducted empirical investigations 
with ordinary people and formulated so called “primary abilities” that he assumed to 
underlie creative thinking. Based on these primary abilities he also argued for the 
existence of “different kinds of creative abilities”, specialized for different domains of 
creativity. As primary abilities he outlined the factors: “sensitivity to problems”, 
“fluency”, “flexibility”, “novelty”, “synthesizing”, “reorganization”, “complexity” and 
“evaluation” (Guilford, 1950). “Sensitivity to problems” enables people to realize 
discrepancies which can lead to new insights or solutions. “Fluency” describes the 
ability to produce a larger number of ideas, which enhances the chances of 
producing something creative. “Flexibility” means the ability to leave old thinking 
paths. “Novelty” stands for originality or uncommonness of ideas. “Synthesizing” is 
the “organizing of ideas into larger, more inclusive patterns”. “Reorganization” stands 
for example for the ability to transform an existing object into a new design. And 
finally, “evaluation” is necessary to decide which ideas are suitable.  
Later, Guilford focused on his well-known “Structure-of-intellect-model” (SOI-model) 
to capture the intellectual abilities which are fundamental for creative thinking 
processes. The SOI-model consists of “contents”, “products” and “operations”. 




Guilford argued that especially “divergent production” and the product called 
“transformation” were essential for creativity (Guilford, 1975). With “transformation” 
he described “any kind of change in an item of information” which provides us with 
flexibility. “Divergent production” became much more prominent in further research 
endeavours in relation to creativity and was later mostly referred to as “divergent 
thinking”. This term represents the retrieval of stored information through a broad 
search procedure. It is often used in situations in which several possible answers 
exist. Guilford described “divergent production” with “the generation of logical 
alternatives”. Logical because these alternatives are not meant to be inappropriate or 
irrational (Guilford, 1975). The concept of divergent thinking is very important for this 
doctoral thesis, as the alternate uses task (AUT), which was used in a modified 
version in the reported studies, in its original form is a divergent thinking task 
(Wallach & Kogan, 1965). 
Another theory of creativity was proposed by Kris (1952) who postulated that 
creative people were better in switching between primary and secondary process 
cognition. Primary process thinking is characterized through free-association, 
imagery, alternate states of consciousness etc., whereas secondary process thinking 
comprises logical, analytical and conscious thinking. The primary process thinking 
mode was believed to facilitate the generation of possible creative products. In 
contrast, secondary process mode allowed for the analysis and verification of 
potentially creative results from primary process mode. 
Sarnoff Mednick developed another influential framework regarding a domain-
general interpretation of creative thinking in associative terms. He defined the 
creative thinking process as “the forming of associative elements into new 
combinations which either meet specified requirements or are in some way useful” 
(Mednick, 1962). He further described three ways to reach this new and useful 
combination of associative elements: “serendipity”, “similarity” and “mediation”. A 
creative solution to a problem would be one which combines two previously remotely 
connected elements to an appropriate result. As one important reason for individual 
differences in the production of creative solutions, Mednick´s theory assumes 
differences in the organization of associations. Accordingly, flat associative 
hierarchies will promote creative solutions due to access to more widely distributed 
associations, whereas steep hierarchies hinder the same because of fewer original 




associations being dominant. A demonstrative example could be taken from the 
remote association test (RAT) which was designed to measure individual differences 
in creativity. In this test, participants are given three words and their task is to find a 
fourth word which is strongly associated to all three other words. For example, the 
fourth word to be found for the given words “rat”, “blue” and “cottage” would be 
“cheese” (Mednick, 1962). Mednick´s theory fits well in later developed ideas about 
spreading activation type search processes in semantic networks (Collins & Loftus, 
1975). 
Mendelsohn (1976) developed this idea further but held that the well-established link 
between RAT scores and external criteria of creative performance was based on 
attentional processes and not associative organizations. He based his thesis on 
findings that the RAT performance could be improved by using instruction cues 
which narrowed down the possible search areas, such as ten solutions will be types 
of animals. These results were interpreted as an evidence for the importance of 
search strategies for higher performances while performing the RAT. Greater or 
broader internal attentional capacities would therefore allow for simultaneous search 
in memory storages and increase the chance of a new combination of remotely 
associated elements.  
This parallel search was later described to take place in a state of “defocused 
attention” (Kaufman et al., 2010; Martindale, 1995; Martindale, 1999) which is 
thought to be reflected in lower levels of cortical activation. In this mental state a 
large number of elements of a neural network can be activated simultaneously, 
which increases the probability that connections between weakly related elements 
are strengthened. The idea of unconscious parallel search processes fits well with 
modern neuroscientific views (Dietrich, 2004; Dijksterhuis & Meurs, 2006). Cognitive 
disinhibition is thought to facilitate creative thinking through the reduction of 
constraining effects (higher cortical activation levels). This relation is today however 
regarded as having a kind of inverted-U function, meaning that some degree of top 
down cognitive control is necessary to think creatively (Abraham, 2014b). 
Dietrich (2004), following some of the aforementioned considerations, proposed in a 
newer theoretical framework that one should differentiate between two processing 
modes, the “deliberate mode” and the “spontaneous mode”, which can both lead to 
creative insights. The spontaneous mode is described as a mental state of reduced 




or altered attentional focus, parallel processing, free-associations, unguided and 
uncontrolled by prefrontal regions. Dreaming is regarded as the extreme form of the 
spontaneous mode. Its origin is assumed to be located in temporal, occipital and 
parietal areas (TOP), with an additional involvement of basal ganglia. The deliberate 
mode, in contrast, which is thought to be initiated by the prefrontal cortex (PFC), 
serves for controlled attentional search and processing. It brings the continuous 
activity in TOP into working memory which enables further manipulation and 
conscious processing of information and at the same time inhibits other not task-
relevant activations. While there is an astonishing similarity between Dietrich`s 
suggestions and Kris (1952) earlier explanations, Dietrich did not refer to Kris’s ideas 
explicitly in his work. There is also considerable overlap between these theories and 
the Geneplore model, which will be introduced in the next section. 
 
1.3 Creative Cognition approach 
One fundamental question in the investigation of creative thinking is: Are there two 
modes of human thinking, one creative and the other normative? Or is there just one 
mode and creative thinking takes place if certain contextual factors come into play 
(Abraham, 2013a)? The creative cognition approach states that creative thinking is 
essentially normative cognition unfolding within situations in which generation 
processes are needed. Contextual factors like task demands are therefore held to 
orchestrate the interplay of normative cognitive processes (Abraham, 2014a). 
Evidence of the human capacity to be generative can be seen in day-to-day acts 
where everyone can create concepts out of experiences and build new linguistic 
constructions through the flexible use of language. People do not have to create 
masterpieces of art to be considered creative as creativity can be found in all 
aspects of human life in lesser scales (Ward et al., 1999).  
In the tradition of experimental cognitive psychology, the creative cognition approach 
seeks to investigate the normative human cognitive operations which underlie 
creative thinking. In doing so it assumes that there are different cognitive processes 
which contribute to creative thinking and that these processes can be investigated 
using experimental methods. For instance, under the Geneplore model (Finke et al., 
1992), which served as an early heuristic model for the creative cognition approach, 




creative products are presumed to result from an alternation between the generation 
of preinventive structures and exploratory processes of these structures. Examples 
of generative processes would be the retrieval of existing knowledge, the formation 
of simple associations, the synthesis of new structures, analogical transfer of 
information and so on (Ward et al., 1999). Exploratory processes include the search 
for potential functions of the structures, the interpretation of structures as 
representing possible solutions to problems, and the search for various practical or 
conceptual limitations that are suggested by the preinventive structures. The 
acknowledgement that creative thinking comprises of different cognitive processes 
opened up the possibility of examining those varied processes using specific 
experimental tasks. These include conceptual expansion, creative imagery, 
overcoming the constraints of examples, and insight. Of special interest for the 
research presented in this work is the process called conceptual expansion which 
will be introduced in more details.  
 
1.3.1 Conceptual expansion 
Conceptual expansion is the core cognitive component of interest which was 
investigated in the reported studies of this doctoral thesis. Humans possess large 
semantic brain networks which contain stored information about real-world 
perceptions as well as abstract thoughts (Binder et al., 2009). A concept can be 
thought of as a container comprising strongly associated information under one 
label. For instance, the concept of a football includes several attributes – that it is 
round, that it can be kicked through the air, that it is used for sports, and so on. The 
advantage of concepts is that it structures our detailed experiences into larger and 
easier to handle information units. Semantically related concepts are more likely to 
be activated jointly as the distance in a semantic network between both concepts is 
rather small. Conceptual expansion refers to the process of widening or loosening 
the boundaries of an existing concept. For example, one manner in which to expand 
the concept of a football is that it could be used as a sunhat after cutting it into two 
halves. Conceptual expansion renders it possible to establish a relation between too 
previously unrelated concepts in a semantic network and thus generate creative 
ideas. T.B. Ward introduced the term “conceptual expansion” in a series of 
behavioral experiments investigating how people imagine a new member of a given 




concept (Ward, 1994). In these experiments subjects were supposed to draw 
animals from another planet very different from earth. Drawings were rated as being 
more novel if they shared less features with existing animals, like bilateral symmetry 
or typical sense organs or appendages. The drawing results showed many common 
features of earth like animals even if participants were explicitly instructed “to use 
their wildest imaginations”. Thus there was a clear tendency to rely on features of 
prior category members which hindered more creative solutions. This less laborious 
generation style was called the “path of least resistance”. Smith and colleagues 
could demonstrate a similar effect in an experiment in which subjects were asked to 
invent as many new toys as possible in a given time. Solutions were less creative if 
some exemplars of possible toys were shown during the introduction phase of the 
experiment (Smith et al., 1993). This effect also remained when subjects were 
explicitly told to generate toys which are very different from the shown exemplars 
(“path of least resistance”). Ward therefore concluded, that the “the heightened 
accessibility of an initially retrieved or presented example makes alternative 
examples less retrievable” (Ward, 1995). Ward could also demonstrate that the 
structuring of imagination could be influenced by task demands. Subjects were more 
likely to imagine innovative features of imagined animals from another planet, when 
the environment of the planet was described (e.g. a planet with seas of molten rocks 
and just a few solid islands). Thus creative solutions can be promoted when starting 
new ideas from a more abstract level rather than concrete existing examples. 
Beside the aforementioned structured imagination task and the novel toy task, the 
process of conceptual expansion can also be assessed using psychometric tests like 
the alternate uses task (Wallach & Kogan, 1965). In this task, subjects are asked to 
name as many uses for a given everyday object as possible (divergent thinking 
task). Subjects reach higher scores if they are able to generate a high number of 
different responses (fluency) and responses which are statistically infrequent in the 
sample (original). For example using a shoe as a plant pot associates two more 
distantly related concepts and would therefore certainly result in a higher original 
score than the use of a shoe as foot protector. Thus this task necessitates an active 
expansion of existing concepts. 
 
 




1.4 Neuroscientific findings regarding creative thinking 
In the past decade, there have been three influential reviews that have summarized 
the neurophysiological findings regarding creative thinking or aspects of creativity in 
detail (Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010; Sawyer, 2011). Unfortunately, all 
three reviews concluded that there was very little empirical consensus regarding the 
neural correlates of creative thinking. 
The following sections will provide a concise overview of different approaches and 
results of studies that have investigated different aspects of creative thinking, 
following a brief introduction to neurophysiological methods used in these studies as 
well as the reported studies of this doctoral thesis, namely functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG).  
 
1.4.1 Creativity and fMRI  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a well-established, non-invasive 
method to examine the location and dynamics of brain activity (Goebel & 
Kriegeskorte, 2005). It is based on the measurement of a signal which depends on 
the oxygenic level in the blood, the so called BOLD (blood-oxygenation-level-
dependent) signal. The underlying principle is that neuronal activity leads to a local 
change in the blood flow and thus to a change in the blood oxygenation. In order to 
measure this variation, subjects who participate in an fMRI experiment are brought 
into a strong magnetic field. They are then irradiated with electromagnetic waves in a 
radio frequency spectrum leading to a measurable magnetic echo, which is 
dependent on the magnetic properties of the respective tissue in the brain. These 
signals are then used to reconstruct three dimensional images of the subject’s brain, 
which are either anatomical or functional dependent on the specific measurement 
settings. Anatomical and functional images are then aligned to display dynamic 
changes in brain activity on detailed anatomical maps. FMRI offers a maximum 
spatial resolution of about 2 mm voxels and a time resolution of a few seconds. The 
advantage of this non-invasive neuroscientific technique lies in the high spatial 
resolution it affords, whereas its relative disadvantage is the limited time resolution 




and the indirect measurement of brain activity which makes it impossible to 
separately measure single neuronal events. 
Over the past 15 years many different paradigms and tasks have been adopted to 
investigate the neural correlates of creative thinking using fMRI and older 
neuroimaging methods (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). 
The earliest approach was to investigate difference in brain activity between highly 
creative and low creative people. Carlson et al. (2000) found more bilateral frontal 
brain activation when performing the alternate uses task in the high-creative group in 
contrast to unilateral left frontal activation in the low-creative group. More recently, 
Chávez-Eakle and colleagues (2007) who also contrasted high and low creative 
groups found higher cerebral blood flow within the right precentral gyrus, right frontal 
rectal gyrus, left orbital gyrus, left inferior gyrus and cerebellum in the high-creative 
group while performing tasks from the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking.  
Another approach is to investigate active creative performances in a laboratory 
setting. For example, Shah and colleagues (Shah et al., 2011) let their subjects pass 
through a scanning procedure consisting of covert reading of a text for 60 seconds, 
copying the first 35 words of a text for 60 seconds, brainstorming following the 
presentation of the first 30 words of the previous text to generate a possible creative 
continuation of the story for 60 seconds, and engaging in creative writing for 140 
seconds to physically write down a creative continuation of the story. The written 
stories were rated by ten German teachers following a standardized rating 
procedure. The brain activation resulting during creative writing when subtracted 
from the activation elicited by the control copying condition was located in the 
temporal pole (BA 38), hippocampus and posterior cingulate cortex (BA 31). A 
further correlation analysis of this activation and the creativity ratings showed a 
positive correlation between brain activation levels and creativity index in temporal 
pole (BA 38) and left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45). These areas are known for their 
involvement in semantic retrieval and integration processes. 
Other studies tried to implement widely employed psychometric methods like the 
alternate uses task (AUT) in neuroimaging paradigms. For example, Fink and 
colleagues (2009) administered four different tasks in their fMRI study: the alternate 
uses task (generate as many uses as possible for a given object), the (object 




characteristic task (list the many characteristics of a given everyday object), invent 
names task (make up an unusual name to given two-letter abbreviation), and the 
words end task (complete the given suffixes). Brain activation specific to the 
alternate uses task was found in the left angular gyrus.  
In a similar vein, Chrysikou and Thompson-Schill (2011) conducted an fMRI 
experiment consisting of three different tasks. In one task, the subjects had to report 
aloud the common use of a seen everyday object (common use condition). Another 
task required subjects to call aloud a new generated use for a seen everyday object. 
A control task was also included where subjects saw scrambled everyday objects 
and were supposed to call aloud “yes” if a black box was superimposed on the 
image and “no” if it was not. The results showed an activation of lateral prefrontal 
cortex during the common use task, whereas the uncommon use task activated 
occipito-temporal cortex. The authors interpreted these findings with the need of 
“heightened attention to visual aspects of the object” during the uncommon use task. 
In contrast the “common use task” required controlled semantic retrieval which could 
account for the PFC activity. 
Green and al. used an analogical reasoning task to study creativity (Green et al., 
2012). The stimuli consisted of word pairs, of the form “A is to B as C is to ?”, with 
varying semantic distance. Analogical mapping of word pairs with higher semantic 
distance was rated as more creative than stimuli with less semantic distance 
between the word pairs. The results revealed parametrical covariation of frontopolar 
cortex (BA 10) activity with semantic distance. Thus higher demands to link two 
distantly related concepts with each other led to higher involvement of the frontopolar 
cortex. This relationship also remained after controlling for task difficulty. 
FMRI studies on insight problem solving have resulted in the most consistent 
findings so far. Insight problem solving most often activates the superior temporal 
gyrus (STS) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). The role of prefrontal areas 
seems to be much more inconclusive as some studies reported an activation of 
frontal areas, whereas other studies did not find such activations (Dietrich & Kanso, 
2010). 
Taken together the multitude of approaches, paradigms and results associated with 
neuroimaging based investigations on creativity, it should not be surprising that a 
clear cut picture about the neuronal correlates of creative thinking is still lacking. 




1.4.2 Creativity and EEG 
EEG is a traditional neurophysiological method to capture electrical activity changes 
of neuronal ensembles at the scalp surface via electrodes. Synchronously firing 
neuronal ensembles with similar spatial orientation leads to measurable EEG 
signals. In EEG studies, different parameters are often reported like for instance 
amplitude changes or power and synchrony changes of EEG signals. Amplitude 
means the magnitude of voltage differences between different electrodes. Power 
describes the frequency spectrum of a signal and synchrony how signals from 
different electrodes correlates to each other. Of special interest for many creativity 
studies was the so-called alpha synchrony, which refers to the synchronous 
occurrence of EEG signals at a frequency range from about 7 to 14 Hz at different 
electrodes. This alpha frequency usually reflects relaxed brain states in the awake 
brain.  
Repeated application of time-locked experimental stimuli under continuous 
measurement renders it possible to average EEG signals and separate stimuli 
related signal changes from baseline activity. This procedure is called event-related 
potentials (ERP). ERPs are a powerful tool to investigate brain activity associated 
with cognitive processes. EEG and ERP come with the advantage of neuronal 
measurement in milliseconds resolution. On the other hand, these methods offer 
only limited spatial resolution, which complicates the mapping of observed neuronal 
activity to specific brain structures.  
Although EEG research has a long tradition Dietrich (2010) pointed out that until the 
late 1990s, just three EEG studies had been conducted in the field of creative 
thinking. Following from the ideas of the aforementioned theories about defocused 
attention and lesser cortical arousal during creativity, EEG studies tended to 
concentrate their efforts mainly on the examination on synchrony changes and 
hemispheric asymmetry (Arden et al., 2010). In one of their studies, for example, 
Martindale et al. (1984) compared brain activation of high- and low-scorers on the 
AUT and RAT during three different speech tasks. Creative subjects showed “high-
levels of right hemisphere activation during creative production”. 
Fink et al. (2009) conducted an EEG experiment using the above already described 
tasks (section 1.5.1). They reported higher levels of alpha synchronization during the 




alternate uses task, especially over frontal brain regions. Subjects who produced 
more original ideas during the alternate uses task displayed a stronger right-
hemispheric alpha synchronization over centro-parietal to parieto-occipital regions. 
This hemispheric asymmetry could not be observed in the low-originality group. 
However, the meta-analyses conducted on findings within the field (Arden et al., 
2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010) summarized that EEG studies could not sufficiently 
prove the claim of a special role for the right brain hemisphere during creative 
thinking. The role of alpha synchronization during creative thinking also remained 
unclear.  
There is a notable lack of ERP studies in the field of creativity. Only a few exceptions 
bear noting here of ERP studies specifically investigating the process of insight. For 
example, Qiu et al. (2008) found a positive signal deflection in a time window of 200 
– 600 ms for insight solutions originating from left superior temporal gyrus and 
posterior cortices. Further successful solutions elicited a negative ERP ongoing 
between 1500 and 2000 ms relating to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In a 
second experiment, the authors were able to demonstrate that a positive ERP 
deflection during the preparatory phase of insight solutions was linked to the ACC. 
Taken together, compared to neuroimaging studies, EEG studies on insight provided 
a relatively more consistent picture as they often observed decreases in alpha power 
during insight and a consistent involvement of the ACC (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010).  
 
1.4.3 Methodological obstacles  
The aforementioned conceptualization problem regarding creativity could explain the 
many scattered findings regarding creativity to some extent. But some of the studies 
reported in previous sections may serve to illustrate which special problems arise if 
one tries to translate creativity experiments into neuroscientific settings. 
First of all, it is debatable whether creativity is suitable to be examined under 
laboratory conditions. Some researchers have argued that the nature of creativity 
involves spontaneity and freedom which contradicts laboratory constraints (Runco & 
Sakamoto, 1999). But even when adopting a less ideological focus, it is a noteworthy 
challenge to develop experimental paradigms in which the time point of the 




investigated creative process of interest can be reliably determined. Merely 
instructing subjects to be creative on cue is not sufficient. 
A second constraint, which maybe contradictory to genuine creative generation, is 
that in order to reach a sufficient number of trials in ERP and fMRI experiments, the 
creative process of interest has to be repeatedly elicited and is therefore is not 
allowed to last too long. Otherwise the complete experimental duration would 
become too overdrawn. So open-end tasks are not suitable for such settings. A 
sufficient number of trials is mandatory for reaching the necessary statistical power 
to be able to detect small neurophysiological changes. Long task durations would 
also complicate the interpretation of any elicited brain activation as these would 
always reflect a mixture of different cognitive processes. 
A third problem arises from the susceptibility of fMRI and EEG measurements to 
movement, whether it comes from verbal speech or limb movements. The described 
study by Shah et al. (2011) may serve as a good example for this. In many 
experiments the possibilities for creative expression or responses are limited. Some 
researchers ask their subjects to avoid any overt response as, for instance, in the 
study of Green et al. (2012). In this experiment, the subjects had to indicate any 
generated solution via a button press. After this, the correct solution was displayed 
and subjects had to indicate whether their solution matched the experimenter 
determined solution word. Such procedures or any post-experimental questionnaire 
certainly avoid movement artefacts and measurement of neurophysiological activity 
purely related to the cognitive process prior to execution of the response. On the 
other hand, it comes with the risk that subjects do not sufficiently follow the task 
instructions or simply invent new responses in post-experimental phases because 
they forgot their original solution. 
One further serious challenge is the conception of suitable control tasks. To avoid 
any confound that could reduce the validity of a measurement or its interpretation, it 
is necessary to eliminate or control other relevant factors that could cloud the pattern 
of findings. Task difficulty would be such a factor in creativity experiments which 
renders it necessary to introduce a control task of at least equal task difficulty. 
This brief presentation of possible obstacles in the investigation of creativity using 
neuroscientific methods should illustrate that these problems lead to a somewhat 




artificial manner of investigation and certainly contributed to the diversity of 
experiments, tasks and lastly results in the past 15 years (please refer to Abraham 
2013 for a detailed analysis of such issues). 
 
1.5 The present studies 
This section will introduce details of the studies that were conducted within this 
doctoral thesis. These studies were designed to approach creativity as a 
multidimensional construct. Following the creative cognition approach, the presented 
studies focused on one described cognitive operation involved in creative thinking, 
which is conceptual expansion. The consideration behind this approach was that 
breaking creativity down into its underlying processes should enhance consistency of 
results across studies using a similar paradigm and facilitate the interpretation of the 
resulting brain activations for future investigations. This new approach was strictly 
oriented at the common definition that the factors of novelty and appropriateness 
jointly contribute to a creative product. Other creativity studies emphasized the 
originality factor and did not adequately account for the appropriateness factor (Fink 
et al., 2010). A new paradigm was also developed in order to prevent some of the 
methodological shortcomings of previous studies, like insufficient trial numbers or 
movement inducing task instructions. As the same paradigm was conducted with two 
different neuroscientific methods (fMRI, ERP), the task design for both studies is the 
same and will be introduced in the following section.  
 
1.5.1 Task design 
A modified version of the alternate uses task (Wallach & Kogan, 1965) was adapted 
for use in both studies. While the original task involves active conceptual expansion 
on the part of the subject, the modified alternate uses task invokes passive 
conceptual expansion. Subjects were presented with word-pairs consisting of an 
everyday object and a suggested use. Their task was to evaluate the object-use 
combination along two dimensions. First, they indicated whether they found the 
suggested use to be unusual or unique. Second, they then indicated whether they 
deemed the object-use combination to be appropriate or fitting. The question 




“unusual” was aimed at assessing the novelty factor whereas the question 
“appropriate” assessed the appropriateness factor. This evaluation led to each 
object-use combination falling into one of three possible categories. Object-use 
combinations could be rated as low-unusual and high-appropriate (common uses), 
high-unusual and low-appropriate (nonsense uses), and high-unusual and high-
appropriate (creative uses). The fourth classification of low-unusual and low-
appropriate did not exist, as a common object-use combination is inherently 
appropriate. Object-use combinations judged to be novel and appropriate (creative 
uses) were trials in which conceptual expansion processing was supposed to occur, 
as in these trials the classic concept of a given object is expanded in a novel manner 
beyond its customary boundary.  
The presented studies therefore investigated conceptual expansion via a passive 
task which brought multiple advantages with it. First, motion artefacts, which would 
occur to a greater extent in an active generation task, are reduced or entirely absent. 
Also, any necessity of post-experimental survey of self-created solutions is avoided. 
These surveys are often compromised in active generation tasks and are also 
susceptible to false-memory effects. Second, it was possible to ensure that 
comparable number of trials across the three possible categories or conditions 
(common uses, nonsense uses, creative uses) were maintained across participants. 
An active generation task could lead to the problem that too few creative uses (novel 
and appropriate) would be generated. Also, an active generation task would 
necessitate the introduction of a further control task, which would lead to an overall 
increase of experimental duration. Third, this passive approach facilitates the 
analysis of brain activation relating to one of the three categories. An active 
generation task would result in brain activation that reflects a mixture of processes 
during object generation rather than separately assessing processing related to 
novelty, appropriateness and conceptual expansion, which is only possible using a 
passive paradigm. The passive paradigm also allows for the time point of interest for 
data analysis to be narrowed down more precisely.  
A major advantage of this innovative task design is also that it does not rely on 
experimenter determined judgments and therefore leaves room for inter-individual 
differences regarding the evaluation of the seen object-use combinations. This is 
extremely important given the differences between subjects in terms of how 




conceptual networks are organized. An association that seems novel for one 
participant may not be novel for another participant. This paradigm allows for 
individual variability to be accounted for.  
This passive approach certainly also has some shortcomings. The ecological validity, 
which is a standard problem in laboratory studies, is even more reduced with a 
passive task. When undertaking a creative enterprise, people would expand 
concepts actively. In a passive paradigm, factors like volition and stronger inhibition 
requirements are to some extent left out. On the other hand, given that the 
conceptual network being expanded upon in active or passive paradigms is one and 
the same, there are strong grounds to argue for largely overlapping mechanisms in 
both cases. There are therefore few grounds to presuppose that active and passive 
conceptual expansion recruit entirely different brain networks. The hypotheses of the 
reported studies regarding the specific brain areas expected to be involved in 
conceptual expansion processing will be outlined in the next section. 
 
1.5.2 fMRI hypotheses 
It was hypothesized that brain activation as a function of conceptual expansion will 
not be limited to a single brain area but will rather engage a brain network consisting 
of prefrontal areas BA 45, BA 47 (anterior and middle inferior frontal gyrus) and BA 
10 (frontopolar cortex), as well as BA 38 (temporal pole) in the temporal lobe. BA 45 
and BA 47 are well-known to be involved in semantic retrieval and selection 
processes (Badre et al., 2005; Thompson-Schill, 2003) and are likely to be activated 
when subjects encounter two unrelated concepts and have to search for a link 
between both in their semantic networks. This is the same reason the temporal pole 
was expected to be activated, as this region plays a crucial role in semantic cognition 
as a possible hub region underlying amodal semantic representations (Rogers et al., 
2004; Patterson et al., 2007b; Lambon Ralph et al., 2010). All these areas involved 
in semantic processing were also expected to be strongly recruited in trials classified 
as “nonsense uses” for the same reason as the creative uses. Creative uses, 
however, were expected to also additionally involve the frontopolar cortex (BA 10) for 
subserving the process of integration of the new discovered previously weakly 
related concepts into an expanded concept. This is because the frontopolar cortex 




has been demonstrated to be involved in relational integration processing (Bunge et 
al., 2005; Green et al., 2010; Kroger et al., 2002).  
 
1.5.3 ERP hypotheses 
The ERP hypotheses were focused on the well-established N400 component. This 
component describes a negative deflection between 200 to 600ms, which peaks 
around 400ms (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011), and was first described in the 
processing of  semantic incongruent sentence endings (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). 
Later it could be demonstrated that this component is also sensitive to a wide range 
of other factors reaching from pure bottom-up stimuli like unusual word capitalization 
(Lotze et al., 2011) to top-down stimuli like world knowledge violations (Hagoort et 
al., 2004). As ERP studies regarding other creative processes beside insight are 
missing, the hypothesis of the presented study was derived from findings in related 
research domains. A N400 component was expected following nonsensical uses 
compared to common uses as this would represent the classic example of semantic 
incongruent stimuli.. However, the interesting case in point would be the N400 
pattern in relation to creative uses. If the N400 indexes processing relevant for 
conceptual expansion, a smaller N400 should be observable in the case of the 
creative uses relative to that of the nonsensical uses. If there were no differences 
between creative uses and nonsensical uses in the N400 time-window, conceptual 
expansion related processing could possibly be reflected in later ERP time-windows.  
The following sections will now describe the conducted studies in detail. 
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Conceptual Expansion is a key process that underlies our ability to think creatively. 
In the present event-related fMRI study, a modified Alternate Uses Task was used to 
identify brain regions involved during passive conceptual expansion and thereby 
separately assess the effects of the two defining elements of creative output: 
Originality (unusualness) and Relevance (appropriateness). Participants viewed 
word pairs consisting of an object and a use and indicated whether the given use 
was unusual and/or appropriate for the given object. Trials with object-use 
combinations judged as unusual and appropriate (HUHA) were contrasted against 
trials judged as just unusual but inappropriate (HULA) or just appropriate but not 
unusual (LUHA). As hypothesized, conceptual expansion related activation (HUHA) 
was found in the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45, 47), left temporal pole (BA 38) 
and left frontopolar cortex (BA 10). We discuss the specific contributions of these 
regions with reference to semantic cognition.  
 
Keywords: fMRI, creative cognition, conceptual expansion, alternate uses task, BA 
47, BA 45, BA 10, BA 38, divergent thinking. 
  





Although the study of creative thinking has a long scientific tradition, little is known 
about the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms. This lack of knowledge is due to 
conceptual problems as well as technical limitations and suboptimal experimental 
paradigms for the neuroscientific investigation of creative thinking (Dietrich, 2004; 
Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). One of the more critical problems is that creative thinking 
has mainly been examined as a unitary construct but with a range of tasks that are 
not comparable to one another. This has led to a multitude of scattered findings. A 
recent review summarized that the only reliable conclusion from neuroimaging 
studies to date is that creative thinking leads to changes in prefrontal brain activation 
(Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Unfortunately, this is also a very unspecific claim given that 
the prefrontal cortex is a large structure which is known to underlie a wide range of 
functions from cognitive control to mental state reasoning (Amodio & Frith, 2006; 
Badre, 2008). The lack of consistency in neuroscientific findings related to creative 
thinking highlights the necessity to develop new paradigms where the construct of 
creativity is investigated in terms of its component processes. 
In comparison to the neuroscience of creative thinking, there is a substantial 
agreement about the definition of creativity from the psychological domain. Creativity 
is typically defined from the product perspective in that a creative product has to be 
original or unusual as well as relevant or appropriate in a certain context (Hennessey 
& Amabile, 2010; Runco, 2004). The first theoretical approach which stressed the 
multifaceted nature of creativity was the creative cognition approach (Finke et al., 
1992). Unlike the tradition of early cognitive models of creativity (Mednick, 1962; 
Mendelsohn, 1976), which focused on individual differences in creative ability, this 
approach examined normal cognitive processes which underlie our ability to think 
creatively. Several types of mental operations are held to be involved in creative 
thinking that are not qualitatively different from normal cognitive processes (Smith et 
al., 1995). 
The aim of the current study was to disentangle the multifaceted construct of 
creativity by identifying brain regions involved in the processing of one critical facet 
of creative thinking, namely the process of conceptual expansion. This process is 
one of the core features of creative thinking in that it involves broadening the existing 
definitions or boundaries of a concept beyond its usual characteristics and therefore 




aids the development of new ideas (Smith et al., 1995; Ward, 1994). In the original 
conceptual expansion task, subjects were asked to imagine and draw an animal 
living on another planet which is very different from Earth (Ward, 1994). In other 
words what was required in this task was to expand the original concept of what an 
animal can look like while still be definable as an animal. The drawings were 
evaluated with respect to deviations from ordinary Earth animals in terms of 
fundamental features like bilateral symmetry and the presence of sense organs. 
Interestingly, subjects revealed a tendency to rely on generic exemplars of animals, 
even when instructed not to do so. This “path-of-least-resistance” strategy or the 
tendency to adopt the least cognitive demanding approach that is possible in a given 
situation is commonly observed when performing generative tasks (Finke, 1990; 
Ward, 1994). Despite its significance, no neuroimaging studies have so far explicitly 
assessed conceptual expansion.  
The original conceptual expansion task cannot be directly implemented in an fMRI 
setup due to problems that would arise from technical difficulties such as drawing 
responses and inadequate number of trials. To overcome some of the difficulties 
which are typically encountered when trying to combine neuroimaging with active 
engagement in creativity tasks, a novel paradigm was developed in the current study 
to induce conceptual expansion. For this purpose we used a modified version of the 
alternate uses task (AUT, Wallach & Kogan, 1965), a classic creative thinking task in 
which conceptual expansion is assessed (Abraham & Windmann, 2007). The AUT 
tests the ability to generate as many uses as possible for common objects (e.g., a 
shoe) and thereby necessitates that the subject expands the usual conceptual 
boundaries in which the object is customarily used (e.g., foot protection). While the 
classic AUT does not dissociate the originality (or unusualness) component from the 
relevance (or appropriateness) component of creativity, the current modification of 
the paradigm enables the concurrent consideration of both these components 
separately (originality OR relevance) as well as together (originality AND relevance). 
In this modified version of the AUT, subjects view word pairs of a common object 
together with a described use for this object and have to decide on a trial-by-trial 
basis whether they find the use for the given object unusual (U), appropriate (A) or 
both. Trials in which subjects judge a particular object use combination to be highly 
unusual and highly appropriate (HUHA) or unfamiliar but fitting are trials in which the 




subjects were induced to loosen the classic boundaries of the presented concepts  
thereby allowing for the conceptual expansion and conceptual integration of the 
previously unrelated concepts. This is in contrast to trials in which subjects decide 
that a particular object use combination is only unusual but not appropriate (high 
unusual and low appropriate – HULA) or only appropriate but not unusual (low 
unusual and high appropriate – LUHA). In this manner, a creative object use 
combination that is unusual and relevant (HUHA) can be separated from a purely 
unusual but irrelevant combination (HULA) as well as from purely relevant but 
common combination (LUHA). This allows for the assessment of the separable 
effects of originality and relevance from that of creative conceptual expansion. 
Instead of just relying on pre-determined conditions, the great advantage of this 
procedure is that the experimental design is individually validated by each participant 
on a trial by trial basis.  
Unlike in the classic AUT, participants in the current study do not have to generate a 
creative (unusual AND appropriate) use for a given object by themselves, but are 
instead presented with a solution to a problem that they judge as being creative. The 
fact that they recognize the bringing together of the two concepts (the object and its 
use) as being unusual but appropriate is proof of passive conceptual expansion 
taking place as they passed such a judgement only when an object-use combination 
was unfamiliar but fitting.  Although we expect quantitative as well as qualitative 
differences in brain activation between an active and a passive conceptual 
expansion paradigm due to factors like volition and a stronger directed memory 
search process in case of the passive conceptual expansion, we assume that the 
type of conceptual expansion induction (volitionally induced in the AUT versus 
externally induced in the current modified AUT), would not affect the general manner 
in which conceptual structures are expanded upon in the human brain. After all, the 
conceptual structures being expanded within either scenario would be one and the 
same. By doing away with the volitional side though, we are able to systematically 
assess the neural underpinnings of passive conceptual expansion without the added 
confounds of increased cognitive difficulty during creative thinking, unpredictability in 
generating creative responses upon cue, and so on. 
We expect to find passive conceptual expansion related activation in three brain 
areas namely the frontopolar cortex (BA 10), the anterior and middle inferior frontal 




gyrus (IFG: BA 45, 47), and the temporal pole (BA 38). This is because bringing two 
concepts together which were previously only weakly or not at all related to one 
another necessitates the activation of these concepts and searching for their 
associative links, both of which require controlled semantic retrieval and selection 
mechanisms. Such processes are known to involve the IFG (Badre et al., 2005; 
Thompson-Schill, 2003). The temporal pole which has also been referred to as the 
“semantic hub” of the brain (Patterson et al., 2007a) has been implicated in the 
extraction of amodal conceptual information and may therefore also play a role in 
search processes in semantic networks. With regard to the separable factors of 
originality (or unusualness) and relevance (or appropriateness), the IFG and 
temporal pole regions would also be expected to be responsive as a function of 
unusualness given the higher demands on semantic selection and retrieval during 
novelty processing.  
One further process that is also needed when expanding an existing concept by 
linking it with another previously unrelated concept is the integration of the detected 
relations between the two previously weakly related or unrelated concepts to form an 
expanded new concept. We hypothesize that this aspect of the conceptual 
expansion processing should engage the lateral frontopolar cortex (BA 10). Although 
the exact function of this brain area is a matter of ongoing debate (Ramnani & Owen, 
2004), there is substantial evidence that it is involved in relational integration 
processing (Bunge et al., 2005; Green et al., 2010; Kroger et al., 2002), where 
multiple relations have to be considered simultaneously in order to infer the correct 
solution of a problem as, for instance, in the Raven’s Progressive Matrices test 
(Christoff et al., 2001). This makes it a candidate region for the integration processes 
during passive conceptual expansion. 
 
2.3 Experimental procedures 
2.3.1 Participants 
Twenty-six right-handed native German-speaking subjects either received a 15 Euro 
payment or a course credit for their participation in the experiment. Six subjects had 
to be excluded from further analysis because they did not meet the minimum 




inclusion criterion of at least 30 trials per condition. One additional subject had to be 
removed due to extensive movement during data acquisition. The final sample 
therefore comprised 19 subjects (10 women; age range = 19-31 years, mean = 
22.68) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of the participants had a 
history of neurological or psychiatric illness or was taking drugs. All gave informed 
consent before participation. The experimental standards were approved by the 
ethics committee of the German Society of Psychology (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Psychologie, DGPs). 
 
2.3.2 Task Design 
We employed an event-related fMRI design. During each trial (Fig. 1), subjects 
viewed a pair of words for 2 s consisting of a common object and a described use for 
this object in each trial. After the presentation of a blank screen for 500 ms, subjects 
were asked to evaluate whether in their opinion the described use for the object was 
unusual or not (Unusual?) and whether it was appropriate or not (Appropriate?). 
This was done by giving a yes/no answer to each of these questions by pressing 
either the left or the right button of a response box. Participants were instructed that 
a use was to be classified as “Unusual” if it was novel or unfamiliar and “Not 
Unusual” if it was known or familiar. They were also instructed that a use was to be 
classified as “Appropriate” if it was fitting or relevant and “Not Appropriate” if it was 
unfitting or irrelevant. Each stimulus was categorized as belonging to one of three 
possible conditions based on the participant’s response. The three possible 
conditions were: high-unusual and high-appropriate (HUHA, yes-yes response), 
high-unusual and low-appropriate (HULA, yes-no response) and low-unusual and 
high-appropriate (LUHA, no-yes response). Subjects were told that a no-no response 
(low unusual and low appropriate) would not make sense as a low appropriate 
response is always highly unusual. 
Each question was shown for 1.5 s followed by a 500 ms blank period so that 
subjects had 2 seconds per question to respond. Each trial started with a jittered 
blank screen (0 – 1.5 s, jittered in steps of 500 ms) followed by a 500 ms fixation 
period consisting of the presentation of a fixation cross for 300 ms and a 200 ms 




blank screen. With a trial length of 10 s and a total of 149 trials (including 14 null 
events), the experimental session lasted 24.83 min.  
 
 
Figure 1. Trial Overview (above) and Examples of the stimuli used in each condition (below). The 
temporal jitter at the start of each trial led to a variable inter stimulus interval of 1.5 to 4.5 seconds 
(steps of 500 ms) due to the constant trial length of 10 seconds. The 0.5 s fixation period consisted 
of 300 ms fixation cross and 200 ms blank screen. 
 
2.3.3 Materials 
Stimuli were pretested in behavioral experiments with another set of subjects. 45 
experimenter-determined word pairs per condition were used to ensure the high 
likelihood of there being a minimum of 30 subject-determined trials in each condition. 
Each object was used in all three conditions (HUHA, HULA and LUHA) in 
combination with a described use for this object. Objects and uses were all single 
words.  
The behavioral pilot studies indicated that some variability was unavoidable when 
using subject-determined trial classifications as, for instance, what one participant 
Shoe ->
…plant pot High unusual and high appropriate (HUHA)
…piece of clothing Low unusual and high appropriate (LUHA)
…electronic device High unusual and low appropriate (HULA)
Toilet seat ->
…picture frame High unusual and high appropriate (HUHA)
…seating Low unusual and high appropriate (LUHA)
…golf club High unusual and low appropriate (HULA)











Complete Trial Length: 10 s




considers to be an unusual and appropriate object-use combination (HUHA) may be 
classified by another subject to be unusual but inappropriate (HULA). A minimum 
inclusion criterion of 30 trials per condition for each subject was therefore set as it 
was imperative that the fMRI analyses were not unduly influenced by widely varying 
trial-condition distributions across subjects. While the subject-determined trial 
classification is a major strength of the current paradigm, it comes with a cost of 
having to exclude all participants who did not meet the strict inclusion criterion.  
 
2.3.4 Imaging Session 
Participants were placed on the scanner bed in a supine position. A two-button 
response box was placed under the right hand, so that the right index and middle 
fingers were positioned on the appropriate response buttons. Stimuli were presented 
under computer control using Presentation® software (Version 0.70, 
www.neurobs.com), in black font (size = 28) on grey background and projected with 
an LCD projector onto a screen in a resolution of 800x600 pixel. Subjects viewed this 
screen through a mirror that was mounted onto the head coil. Prior to the imaging 
session, participants were given written instructions and performed a 5-minute 
practice session on a computer outside the scanner. After the imaging session, 
subjects received a post-experimental survey as well as a list of stimuli which they 
had just seen in the experiment and were asked to rate on a 5-point scale whether 
they had already known the object use combinations prior to the experiment. 1 
 
2.3.5 Data Acquisition  
Functional MRI was acquired via whole-body 1.5 Tesla Siemens Symphony scanner 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with a standard head coil at the Bender Institute of 
Neuroimaging. A single-shot gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence was used 
                                            
1
 Results of the post-experimental survey are not presented here because of a memory bias which 
occurred due to the prior presentation of the stimuli in the experiment. Participants who were 
confronted with the stimuli during the fMRI session tended to rate the object-use combinations as 
more familiar in the post-fmri session than participants in a control group who did not participate in the 
main experiment. We postulate that the engagement with the stimuli during the fMRI session and the 
successful integration of unusual but appropriate object-use combinations into existing semantic 
networks led to this memory bias.   




with the following parameters: 25 axial slices; repetition time (TR), 2500 ms; echo 
time (TE), 55 ms; flip angle (FA), 90o; field of view (FOV), 192 mm; voxel size, 3x3x3 
mm; slice thickness, 5mm; gap, 1mm; volumes: 614. A detailed T1-weighted 
anatomical MP-RAGE (magnetized prepared rapidly aquired gradient echo) 
sequence consisting of 160 volumes (1mm slice thickness) was conducted with the 
same spatial image orientation as the functional data.  
 
2.3.6 fMRI Data Analysis 
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM 8 routines (Wellcome Department 
of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The preprocessing procedure consisted of a 
realignment to the first image, slice time correction, coregistration of functional and 
anatomical data, segmentation and normalization to the standard brain of the 
Montreal Neurological Institute and smoothing with a Gaussian kernel with a full 
width at half maximum (FWHM) of 9 mm. Low-frequency signal changes and 
baseline drifts were removed using a high-pass filter set at 150 seconds. 
Event-related BOLD responses were analyzed using the general linear model with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function combined with time and dispersion 
derivatives time-locked to the onset of the event. The design matrix included one 
regressor for each condition (HUHA, HULA, LUHA, null events), one regressor for 
each question (Question 1: unusual, Question 2: appropriate, together with the 
reaction time of the button press as a parametric modulation parameter), and the six 
movement parameters from the realignment procedure. The regressors for each 
condition were determined individually according to the individual responses of each 
participant. Pairwise T-contrasts between the three conditions were computed and 
the resulting contrast images were used for second level analysis. 
The main focus centred on three second-level conjunctions which were computed for 
whole brain analysis as well as a priori defined regions of interest via paired T-Test 
routines. These revealed which brain regions were commonly activated across 
contrasts as a function of a particular process of interest. First Conjunction 
(Conceptual Expansion): HUHA > HULA ∩ HUHA > LUHA. Second Conjunction 
(Unusualness): HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA. Third Conjunction 
(Appropriateness): HUHA > HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA.  




For both the whole brain and the ROI analysis a family-wise error (FWE) of  p < .05 
was applied to correct for multiple comparisons. The ROI analyses were performed 
for a priori predicted regions (BAs 10, 45, 47, 38, 21) using the WFU Pickatlas 
toolbox version 2.5.2 for SPM (Maldjian et al., 2003; Maldjian et al., 2004). 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Behavioral Findings 
We carried out a 3 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA to check for differences in 
reaction times between the three types of conditions (HUHA, HULA, LUHA) and two 
types of questions (Question 1: unusual, Question 2: appropriate). We found 
significant main effects for the condition type (F (2,38) = 8.173 p = .001) and 
question type (F (1,19) = 40.576 p < .001) as well as a significant interaction (F 
(2,38)= 6.684 p= .003). Bonferroni corrected (p < .05) post hoc T-tests revealed that 
subjects significantly took longer to respond to the second question (appropriate) in 
the HUHA condition compared to the second question in the HULA (p = .001) and 
the LUHA condition (p = .004). Additionally subjects responded significantly faster to 
the second question compared to the first question, independent of type of condition. 
See Table 1 for mean reaction times and standard deviation. 
 
Table 1. Reaction times (mean and standard deviation in milliseconds) for all three conditions. 
   
Conditions    Unusual (Question 1)    Appropriate (Question 2) 
   


























2.4.2 fMRI Findings 
Whole brain and region of interest analysis for a priori defined regions BA 10, BA 47, 
BA 45 and BA 38 were carried out. We also did exploratory analysis to reveal 
additional activated regions. All activations reported were FWE-corrected for multiple 
comparisons (p < .05). 
 
 
Figure 2. Passive Conceptual Expansion related activation in A: IFG (BA 44/45), B: anterior IFG (BA 
47), C: Frontopolar Cortex (BA 10, ROI analysis, p < .005 uncorrected), D: dorsal ACC (BA 32/ BA 8), 
E: Temporal Poles (BA 38, ROI analysis, p < .005 uncorrected). Color bars represent T-values. 
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2.4.3 Passive Conceptual Expansion 
To determine which brain regions were activated during passive conceptual 
expansion (HUHA), a conjunction analysis was conducted (HUHA > HULA ∩ HUHA 
> LUHA) (Results in Table 2). Consistent with our prediction, passive conceptual 
expansion related activation was found in left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) with 




Table 2. Passive Conceptual Expansion: Whole Brain Analysis and Region of Interest Analysis. 
Anatomical Specification, MNI coordinates, number of voxels (l.m.: another local maxima in the cluster 
above), maximum T-value of the significantly activated areas in the HUHA > HULA ∩ HUHA > LUHA 
conjunction analysis. All results were corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) at p < .05.  
 
Area BA Side x y z Cluster size T-value p 
         
Conceptual Expansion Whole Brain Analysis 
 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47/45/10 L -36 35 4 56 12.43 .000 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 44/45 L -45 11 16 76 10.76 .000 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 46/45 R 51 38 4 12 9.82 .000 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 R 27 29 -11 5 9.52 .000 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -27 23 -14 3 7.33 .021 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 R 51 26 1 1 6.86 .046 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 
(med) 
32/8 L 
-9 23 46 27 9.58 .000 
Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 L -21 14 52 l.m. 7.30 .022 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 24 L -6 23 19 1 7.38 .019 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 32 L -9 26 22 1 7.29 .023 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 32 L -9 29 28 1 7.19 .027 
Anterior Cingulate Cortex 32 L -6 32 31 1 6.82 .048 
Subthalamic Nucleus  R 9 -13 -8 14 9.95 .000 
Hypothalamus   L -9 -5 -1 23 9.15 .001 
Subthalamic Nucleus  L -6 -10 -8 l.m. 8.01 .005 
 
  





Area BA Side x y z Cluster size T-value p 
         
Conceptual Expansion Region Of Interest Analysis 
         
Lateral Frontopolar Cortex 10 L -36 38 13 7 6.02 .003 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 L -27 26 -14 48 6.95 .000 
  L -36 29 -2 l.m. 6.28 .001 
  L -42 20 -11 l.m. 5.43 .005 
  L -33 14 -20 1 4.71 .022 
  L -39 26 -17 1 4.71 .022 
  L -42 41 -8 1 4.60 .028 
  L 30 23 -8 1 4.46 .038 
  R 51 26 1 2 6.86 .000 
  R 54 26 -5 1 6.59 .000 
  R 27 32 -8 7 6.19 .001 
  R 51 23 -8 5 5.26 .007 
  R 48 35 -2 1 5.10 .009 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 L -51 17 16 24 7.06 .000 
  L -54 11 19 2 5.79 .001 
  L -36 26 7 4 5.50 .002 
  R 51 35 4 2 9.81 .000 
  R 51 26 1 2 6.86 .000 
  R 51 26 22 4 4.69 .011 
Temporal Poles 38 L -48 20 -11 2 4.72 .017 
  L -45 17 -14 1 4.39 .036 
         
 
 
Although no peak activations were found in the frontopolar cortex or temporal pole in 
the whole brain analysis, the results of the region of interest analysis showed 
passive conceptual expansion related activation in the left frontopolar cortex (BA 10) 
and the left temporal pole (BA 38), as well as in the bilateral IFG (BA 45, 47). The 
whole brain analysis also revealed the involvement of the left rostral cingulate zone 
(BA 32, 8, 6). 
  




2.4.4 Unusualness and Appropriateness 
The conjunction analysis for unusualness (HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA) did not 
reveal the predicted involvement of the IFG or the temporal poles. Brain regions that 
were instead found to be activated for the unusualness conjunction included the left 
supramarginal gyrus (BA 2/40) (Table 3). 
 
 
Table 3. Unusualness: Whole Brain Analysis and Region of Interest Analysis. Anatomical 
Specification, MNI coordinates, number of voxels (l.m.: another local maxima in the cluster above), 
maximum T-value of the significantly activated areas in the HUHA > LUHA ∩ HULA > LUHA 
conjunction analysis. All results were corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) at p < .05. 
 




         
Unusualness:  Whole Brain Analysis 
         
Supramarginal Gyrus 2/40 L -63 -31 40 12 8.58 .000 
         
Unusualness:  Region Of Interest Analysis 
         
Lateral Frontopolar Cortex 10 L -39 38 16 2 5.31 .012 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 No activation found 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 No activation found 
Temporal Poles 38 No activation found 
         
 
The appropriateness conjunction (HUHA > HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA) resulted in 
significant activations mainly in posterior and anterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31, 24, 32) 











Table 4. Appropriateness: Whole Brain Analysis and Region of Interest Analysis. Anatomical 
Specification, MNI coordinates, number of voxels (l.m.: another local maxima in the cluster above), 
maximum T-value of the significantly activated areas in the HUHA > HULA ∩ LUHA > HULA 
conjunction analysis. All results were corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) at p < .05. 
 
Area BA Side x y z Cluster size T-value p 
         
Appropriateness: Whole Brain Analysis 
         
Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 31 L -6 -55 22 29 9.84 .000 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 9 L -6 44 34 21 8.54 .002 
Medial Frontal Gyrus 9 L -9 53 31 l.m. 7.99 .006 
Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 24 R 3 35 7 38 8.31 .004 
Anterior Cingulate Gyrus 32 L -3 44 10 l.m. 8.15 .005 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -60 -7 -20 3 7.71 .010 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -60 -16 -11 3 7.52 .015 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -63 -10 -14 1 7.51 .015 
Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 L -54 -16 -20 1 7.03 .037 
Angular Gyrus 39 R 57 -58 28 5 7.82 .009 
Angular Gyrus 39 L -54 -64 28 2 7.25 .024 
         
Appropriateness: Region Of Interest Analysis 
         
Lateral Frontopolar Cortex 10 L -9 47 10 71 7.64 .000 
  L -3 59 28 l.m. 6.46 .001 
  L -3 53 -2 l.m. 5.96 .003 
  R 3 53 10 41 5.99 .003 
  R 6 53 -2 l.m. 5.98 .003 
  R 3 47 -8 1 4.90 .030 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 No activation found 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 No activation found 
Temporal Poles 38 L -48 17 -17 6 5.67 .002 
  L -42 8 -29 1 4.44 .032 
  L -51 14 -20 1 4.31 .042 
         





Using a novel paradigm, the aim of this study was to disentangle the multifaceted 
construct of creative cognition by investigating our capacity to engage in passive 
conceptual expansion which involves the bringing together of original and relevant 
semantic connections. The paradigm enabled us to dissociate the brain responses 
associated with passive conceptual expansion (unusual and appropriate) compared 
to the processing of purely unusual (only original) or purely appropriate (only 
relevant) responses and was individually validated by each subject on a trial by trial 
basis. 
 
2.5.1 Passive Conceptual Expansion 
In order to identify brain regions selectively involved in the process of passive 
conceptual expansion, we compared trials judged as high unusual and high 
appropriate (HUHA) against trials rated as high unusual but low appropriate (HULA) 
as well as low unusual and high appropriate trials (LUHA). In line with our 
predictions, passive conceptual expansion related activation was found in the 
frontopolar cortex (BA 10), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG: BA 45, 47) and temporal pole 
(BA 38).  
The IFG activity is likely to reflect higher semantic retrieval and selection demands 
due to the effort incurred by searching for the link between the weakly associated 
concepts presented in the object-use combination. This region is known to be 
involved in semantic processing (Bookheimer, 2002; Binder et al., 2009), exhibits 
stronger BOLD responses to concepts with low associative strengths, and is 
sensitive to semantic distance between concepts during analogical reasoning (Green 
et al., 2010; Bunge et al., 2005). More specifically, it has been proposed that the 
anterior portion of the IFG (BA 47) plays a major role in controlled semantic retrieval, 
whereas the middle IFG (BA 45) is more involved in the selection of retrieved 
semantic representation (Badre & Wagner, 2007) .  
Stronger passive conceptual expansion related activation was also expected to be 
found in the so-called “semantic hub” region of the brain in the temporal poles (BA 
38) given its role in the storage of amodal conceptual knowledge. This has been 




shown in experiments using rTMS that disrupted neural processing in this area as 
well as in semantic dementia patients with atrophy of this region (Lambon Ralph & 
Patterson, 2008; Lambon Ralph et al., 2009).   
The lateral frontopolar cortex was expected to play a key role in the integrational 
processing demands that arise during passive conceptual expansion. This brain area 
is engaged during relational reasoning on the most abstract level (Badre, 2008) as 
well as in monitoring and integration of subgoals during working memory tasks 
(Braver & Bongiolatti, 2002), and during active processing of self-generated or 
inferred information (Christoff et al., 2003; Christoff et al., 2004). Activity in the 
frontopolar cortex has also been shown to co-vary parametrically with increasing 
semantic distance between items in an analogical reasoning task (Green et al., 
2010) as well as with relational complexity, which corresponds to the number of 
relations simultaneously kept in mind while inferring conclusions (Kroger et al., 
2002). In an effort to bring together the diverse task-related findings in this region 
into a more task-independent general description, Ramnani and Owen (2004) 
argued that the frontopolar cortex is required for integration of output results from 
multiple cognitive operations while following a higher behavioral goal. Taken together 
the data fit very well with the idea that the lateral frontopolar cortex is involved in 
passive conceptual expansion as this process demands the integration of two 
previously weakly related or unrelated concepts. 
 
2.5.2 Active versus Passive Conceptual Expansion 
It must be noted that our study investigated the processing of passive conceptual 
expansion which we expect to differ from a situation in which a person has to actively 
expand an existing concept on a generative basis. We assume that beside other 
relevant factors such as a stronger convergent memory search process during a 
passive conceptual expansion task, the most obvious difference between a passive 
and an active approach would lie in the volitional side of bringing about the 
expansion. Nevertheless we would postulate that the actual expansion of the 
concept would be expected to involve similar structures related to semantic cognition 
in the brain regardless of whether it was initiated volitionally or induced 
automatically. This is because information processing demands on the access, 




selection, retrieval and integration of semantic information would be necessary 
regardless of whether the conceptual expansion was actively or passively induced. It 
would be expected that volitionally induced or active conceptual expansion will 
engage similiar brain areas to a greater extent compared to passively-evoked 
conceptual expansion (quantitative changes). Several further structures (such as 
hypothetical reasoning, inhibitory control and extended cognitive control related brain 
regions) would also be expected to be involved during active conceptual expansion 
(qualitative differences).  
Some studies have inadvertently investigated active conceptual expansion without 
explicitly referring to such a process (Chrysikou & Thompson-Schill, 2011; Fink et al., 
2010). For example in a fMRI study from Chrysikou et al. (2011) one group of 
participants were required to actively retrieve the common use of an everyday object 
while another group were required to generate a creative use. Common use 
generation activated the lateral prefrontal cortex, whereas the creative use 
generation led to activations in occipito-temporal cortex. Unfortunately these results 
are not directly comparable to the results derived from the paradigm used in the 
current study due to critical differences in the paradigms such as not distinguishing 
between unusual and appropriate uses (as creative uses are defined) from merely 
unusual but inappropriate uses. The same limitation in integrating the current results 
with those in the literature applies to the study by Fink et al. (2010) in which the 
active generation of original ideas was associated with higher activation in the 
anterior supramarginal gyrus. We found a similar region (almost the same MNI 
coordinates) to be significantly activated during unusualness processing in general, 
but not during passive conceptual expansion. The fact that we accounted for both 
originality and appropriateness of the association might explain the divergence 
between the findings. 
 
2.5.3 Unusualness and Appropriateness 
The processing of unusual object use combinations was also expected to lead to 
activations in the IFG and the temporal pole given the literature on semantic memory 
retrieval and storage processing, as well as the responsiveness of this region with 
reference to semantic associative strength (Bunge et al., 2005). The results of the 




current study however did not support these hypotheses. One possible interpretation 
of the results is to align it to what is known about semantic processing with regard to 
spreading activation in semantic networks (Collins & Loftus, 1975). In the HUHA and 
LUHA trials, a semantic connection between the concepts could be forged because 
of a strong (LUHA) or weak (HUHA) overlap of the activated associated semantic 
nodes. However, because the stimuli cannot be related to one another in the HULA 
trials, there would be no overlaps in the associated activated semantic nodes in the 
network that would enable the linkage of the two concepts. The semantic search 
process in the case of HULA could therefore be readily aborted because of the 
speed of the spontaneous spreading activation in semantic networks. The current 
behavioral data lends some support to this interpretation as the subjects responded 
“No” to the appropriateness question in the HULA condition with comparable speed 
as they did “Yes” to the appropriateness question in the LUHA condition. This 
indicates an equally prompt processing of the stimuli in both the HULA and LUHA 
condition with respect to the appropriateness question. The reported activation of the 
supramarginal gyrus in the HULA condition is in line with results from other studies 
investigating the active generation of unusual object uses (Fink et al., 2010). 
The appropriateness conjunction yielded activation in posterior cingulate (BA 31) and 
parts of the frontomedian wall (BA 9/32), regions that are known to be involved in 
declarative memory retrieval (Abraham et al., 2008). In a more recent fMRI study, 
medial prefrontal cortex activation was shown to be associated with enhanced 
memory retrieval of information congruent with prior knowledge (van Kesteren et al., 
2010). This corresponds partially with the current observations of appropriateness-
related activations in medial prefrontal regions as information judged to be 
appropriate was either congruent with prior knowledge (LUHA) or could be added to 
existing knowledge (HUHA).   
All in all the evidence suggests that  the information processing of sheer 
unusualness or novelty recruits posterior brain regions, whereas appropriateness 
and conceptual expansion related information processing necessitates the 
involvement of frontal regions in the brain.    
 




2.5.4 Other relevant findings 
Our exploratory analysis revealed that apart from the IFG activation, the second 
main frontal activation cluster found during passive conceptual expansion comprised 
the dorsal ACC (BA 32) and parts of BA 8 and BA 6 (rostral cingulate zone). These 
areas are customarily thought to be involved in detection of errors or conflicts 
between competing representations as a form of action monitoring during decision 
making and the consequent recruitment of cognitive control mechanisms and 
adjustments in motor behavior (Botvinick et al., 2004; Carter & van, V, 2007; Mars et 
al., 2005; Rushworth et al., 2004; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2004). This fits well with 
the considerations about what subjects actually had to do during the HUHA 
condition. We presume that the decision conflict was higher in the HUHA condition 
compared to the other two conditions (HULA, LUHA) given that the subjects had to 
initiate controlled search in semantic networks, select between competing 
representations and to adjust their decision outcome as a consequence of the 
successfully retrieved conceptual links between the presented object-use pair. Such 
demands could render the engagement of the rostral cingulate zone necessary. This 
region has indeed been reported in other neuroimaging studies of creative thinking, 
especially in insight problem solving experiments (Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2009; Jung-
Beeman et al., 2004). 
 
2.5.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In summary, a novel neuroscientific paradigm was successfully developed to 
investigate one mental operation underlying our ability to think creatively, namely 
passive conceptual expansion. In doing so, we overcame traditional approaches in 
the field of creativity research which dealt with the creativity construct as a unitary 
entity. This study is also the first to dissociate the brain activity relating to the 
conjoined and separable effects of originality versus relevance, the two defining 
components of creativity. The next step in investigating operations underlying 
creative conceptual expansion would be to compare the current findings with those 
ensuing from an active conceptual expansion paradigm in terms of both qualitative 
and quantitative differences. Future neuroimaging research on creative thinking 
should also consider the role played by other relevant mental operations, such as 




creative imagery and the constraining influence of examples (Abraham & Windmann, 
2007)  
The findings of the present study show that a better understanding of the neural 
correlates of creative thinking is enabled when paradigms are developed that are 
optimised for neuroscientific investigations and where the construct of creative 
thinking is broken down into its underlying processes. Moreover, the findings 
highlight the need to integrate the literature on the neuroscience of creative thinking 
with that of “normative” cognition and to generally do away with the conviction that 
creative operations are qualitative different from other mental processes.  
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2.7 Supplementary material 
List of stimuli used in the experiment and the proportion of classifications among all 
subjects. 
 
Object -> Use HUHA HULA LUHA Error 
Kaugummi -> Atemfrische 0 0 100 0 
Kaugummi -> Dünger 16,8 84,2 0 0 
Kaugummi -> Spachtelmasse 84,2 16,8 0 0 
Küchenschere -> Packungsöffner 5,3 0 94,7 0 
Küchenschere -> Zahnbürste 0 100 0 0 
Küchenschere -> Pizzaschneider 94,7 0 5,3 0 
Stromkabel -> Steckdosenverbindung 10,5 0 84,2 5,3 
Stromkabel -> Strickwolle 26,3 68,4 5,3 0 
Stromkabel -> Springseil 94,7 5,3 0 0 
Kunstrasen -> Fußballrasen 0 0 100 0 
Kunstrasen -> Fernseher 0 100 0 0 
Kunstrasen -> Badvorleger 89,5 10,5 0 0 
Wodka -> Cocktailzutat 5,3 0 89,5 5,3 
Wodka -> Essigersatz 42,1 57,9 0 0 
Wodka -> Brillenputzmittel 89,5 10,5 0 0 
CD-ROM -> Datenträger 0 0 100 0 
CD-ROM -> Reifen 5,3 94,7 0 0 
CD-ROM -> Untersetzer 84,2 5,3 10,5 0 
Kissenbezug -> Bettwäsche 0 5,3 94,7 0 
Kissenbezug -> Einkaufswagen 26,3 68,4 0 5,3 




Kissenbezug -> Salatschleuder 52,6 36,8 10,5 0 
Kaffeefilter -> Kaffeezubereitung 0 0 100 0 
Kaffeefilter -> Tasse 5,3 78,9 10,5 5,3 
Kaffeefilter -> Mundschutz 84,2 15,8 0 0 
Schwimmflossen -> Schwimmhilfe 0 0 100 0 
Schwimmflossen -> Toaster 0 100 0 0 
Schwimmflossen -> Ventilatorblätter 73,7 26,3 0 0 
Kokosnuss -> Nahrung 5,3 0 94,7 0 
Kokosnuss -> Tastatur 0 100 0 0 
Kokosnuss -> Bocciakugel 89,5 10,5 0 0 
Babybett -> Schlafmöglichkeit 0 5,3 94,7 0 
Babybett -> Rakete 15,8 78,9 0 5,3 
Babybett -> Hasenstall 89,5 5,3 5,3 0 
Duschkopf -> Wasserspender 10,5 0 89,5 0 
Duschkopf -> Kochlöffel 36,8 63,2 0 0 
Duschkopf -> Hammer 84,2 15,8 0 0 
Schlittschuh -> Eislaufen 0 0 100 0 
Schlittschuh -> Feuerlöscher 0 100 0 0 
Schlittschuh -> Hackmesser 89,5 10,5 0 0 
Scheckkarte -> Zahlungsmittel 5,3 0 89,5 5,3 
Scheckkarte -> Monitor 0 94,7 0 5,3 
Scheckkarte -> Buttermesser 84,2 15,8 0 0 
Nagelfeile -> Maniküre 0 0 94,7 1 
Nagelfeile -> Klebeband 0 94,7 5,3 0 
Nagelfeile -> Möhrenschäler 57,9 42,1 0 0 
Paddel -> Ruderhilfe 0 0 94,7 5,3 




Paddel -> Würfel 0 100 0 0 
Paddel -> Brotschieber 73,7 21,1 5,3 0 
Schuh -> Kleidungsstück 0 0 100 0 
Schuh -> Computer 0 100 0 0 
Schuh -> Blumentopf 68,4 26,3 5,3 0 
Nylonstrumpf -> Frauenkleidung 0 0 100 0 
Nylonstrumpf -> Luftballon 0 100 0 0 
Nylonstrumpf -> Staubfilter 89,5 10,5 0 0 
Toilettenpapier -> Hygieneartikel 5,3 0 94,7 0 
Toilettenpapier -> Locher 7 94,7 7 5,3 
Toilettenpapier -> Kissenfüllung 100 0 0 0 
Tennisschläger -> Sportgerät 0 0 100 0 
Tennisschläger -> Duschvorhang 0 100 0 0 
Tennisschläger -> Nudelsieb 78,9 21,1 0 0 
Skateboard -> Skaten 0 0 100 0 
Skateboard -> Schornstein 0 94,7 0 5,3 
Skateboard -> Topfuntersetzer 78,9 10,5 5,3 5,3 
Eiswaffel -> Eiskugelbehälter 0 0 100 0 
Eiswaffel -> Heckenschere 0 100 0 0 
Eiswaffel -> Sandförmchen 78,9 15,8 5,3 0 
Stricknadel -> Handarbeit 0 0 100 0 
Stricknadel -> Zigarre 0 100 0 0 
Stricknadel -> Essstäbchen 94,7 0 0 5,3 
Plattenspieler -> Musikabspielgerät 0 0 100 0 
Plattenspieler -> Waage 5,3 89,5 0 5,3 
Plattenspieler -> Töpferscheibe 89,5 5,3 0 5,3 




Trampolin -> Turngerät 0 0 100 0 
Trampolin -> Motorroller 0 100 0 0 
Trampolin -> Bett 84,2 5,3 10,5 0 
Bügelbrett -> Bügelunterlage 0 0 100 0 
Bügelbrett -> Wasserkocher 0 100 0 0 
Bügelbrett -> Wandregal 57,9 42,1 0 0 
Gabel -> Essen 0 0 100 0 
Gabel -> Hundehütte 0 100 0 0 
Gabel -> Kamm 94,7 0 5,3 0 
Zuckerguss -> Kuchenglasur 0 0 100 0 
Zuckerguss -> Bodylotion 21,1 78,9 0 0 
Zuckerguss -> Haarstyling 57,9 31,6 10,5 0 
Thermoskanne -> Kaffeewärmer 5,3 0 89,5 5,3 
Thermoskanne -> Schuh 5,3 94,7 0 0 
Thermoskanne -> Vase 94,7 0 0 5,3 
Streichhölzer -> Anzünder 0 0 100 0 
Streichhölzer -> Radkappe 0 94,7 0 5,3 
Streichhölzer -> Käsespieße 94,7 0 5,3 0 
Bierkasten -> Flaschentransport 10,5 0 89,5 0 
Bierkasten -> Teleskop 0 100 0 0 
Bierkasten -> Nachttisch 89,5 0 10,5 0 
Klobrille -> Sitzfläche 10,5 5,3 84,2 0 
Klobrille -> Golfschläger 15,8 84,2 0 0 
Klobrille -> Bilderrahmen 78,9 15,8 0 5,3 
Tür -> Durchgang 5,3 0 94,7 0 
Tür -> Schubkarre 5,3 94,7 0 0 




Tür -> Tischtennisplatte 84,2 15,8 0 0 
Surfbrett -> Wellenreiten 5,3 0 89,5 5,3 
Surfbrett -> Kochtopf 0 100 0 0 
Surfbrett -> Bügelbrett 89,5 5,3 5,3 0 
Gießkanne -> Gartengerät 0 0 100 0 
Gießkanne -> Hut 21,1 0 78,9 0 
Gießkanne -> Weinkaraffe 94,7 5,3 0 0 
Strohhalm -> Trinken 68,4 26,3 0 5,3 
Strohhalm -> Rasierer 0 100 0 0 
Strohhalm -> Pipette 68,4 26,3 5,3 0 
Pfannenwender -> Küchenutensilie 0 0 100 0 
Pfannenwender -> Fernbedienung 5,3 94,7 0 0 
Pfannenwender -> Spachtel 89,5 0 0 10,5 
Spaghetti -> Pastagericht 0 0 100 0 
Spaghetti -> Wattebausch 0 100 0 0 
Spaghetti -> Mikado 89,5 10,5 0 0 
Billardkugel -> Billardspiel 0 0 100 0 
Billardkugel -> Hängematte 0 100 0 0 
Billardkugel -> Türknauf 94,7 5,3 0 0 
Zollstock -> Messinstrument 0 0 100 0 
Zollstock -> Ball 0 100 0 0 
Zollstock -> Gardinenstange 84,2 10,5 0 5,3 
Kronkorken -> Flaschenverschluss 0 0 100 0 
Kronkorken -> Zahnbürste 0 100 0 0 
Kronkorken -> Ausstechform 84,2 10,5 0 5,3 
Wattebausch -> Abschminken 0 0 100 0 




Wattebausch -> Laterne 5,3 89,5 0 5,3 
Wattebausch -> Christbaumschmuck 78,9 5,3 15,8 0 
Kanu -> Boot 0 0 89,5 10,5 
Kanu -> Telefon 0 100 0 0 
Kanu -> Badewanne 100 0 0 0 
Löffel -> Besteck 0 5,3 94,7 0 
Löffel -> Portemonnaie 0 94,7 5,3 0 
Löffel -> Blumenschaufel 94,7 5,3 0 0 
Geweih -> Wandschmuck 5,3 5,3 84,2 5,3 
Geweih -> Degen 52,6 47,4 0 0 
Geweih -> Kleiderhaken 94,7 0 5,3 0 
 
  




3 Study 2 
An ERP study of passive creative conceptual expansion using a 
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A novel ERP paradigm was employed to investigate conceptual expansion, a central 
component of creative thinking. Participants were presented with word pairs, 
consisting of everyday objects and uses for these objects, which had to be judged 
based on the two defining criteria of creative products: unusualness and 
appropriateness. Three subject-determined trial types resulted from this judgement: 
High unusual and low appropriate (nonsensical uses), low unusual and high 
appropriate (common uses), and high unusual and high appropriate (creative uses). 
Word pairs of the creative uses type are held to passively induce conceptual 
expansion. The N400 component was not specifically modulated by conceptual 
expansion but was, instead, generally responsive as a function of unusualness or 
novelty of the stimuli (nonsense = creative > common). Explorative analyses in a 
later time window (500 – 900 ms) revealed that ERP activity in this phase indexes 
appropriateness (nonsense > creative = common). In the discussion of these 
findings with reference to the literature on semantic cognition, both components are 
proposed as indexing processes relevant to conceptual expansion as they are 
selectively involved in the encoding and integration of a newly established semantic 
connection between two previously unrelated concepts. 
 
Keywords: creativity; ERP; N400; conceptual expansion; alternate uses task, 
divergent thinking; semantic cognition 
  





3.2.1 Current state of creativity research 
Ever since brain based investigations of creative thinking emerged around two 
decades after Joy Paul Guilford gave his Presidential Address about creativity to the 
American Psychological Association in 1950 (Arden et al., 2010; Guilford, 1950), 
many efforts have been made to investigate our ability to think creatively. While 
neuroscientific investigations of creativity primarily employed EEG based 
methodologies, the past 10-15 years have also witnessed a great surge of 
neuroimaging studies on creative thinking. However, we are still far from 
understanding the specific neural underpinnings of creative cognition as what has 
emerged after four decades of creativity research are a multitude of scattered results 
and few consistent conclusions (Arden et al., 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). This is 
due to many factors such as a great deal of diversity in how creative thinking is 
measured, as well as a high variance regarding appropriate control tasks. In 
addition, the neuroscientific study of creativity is also challenging as it is often difficult 
to determine the exact time point of the process of interest, as well as to obtain 
enough trials to reach sufficient statistical power, or, for instance, to prevent 
movement inducing responses which could lead to artefacts (Abraham et al., 2012b; 
Abraham, 2012).  
One further challenging problem is that there is a tendency to investigate creativity 
as though it is a unitary construct (Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). In an effort to go against 
such trends, new paradigms have been adopted in recent neuroimaging studies 
where select operations of creativity, such as conceptual expansion, have been 
targeted (Abraham et al., 2012a; Abraham et al., 2012b; Rutter et al., 2012b; Kröger 
et al., 2012) Conceptual expansion describes the ability to broaden the defining 
boundaries of semantic concepts beyond their usual characteristics (Smith et al., 
1995; Ward, 1994) This is a process that is vital in the generation of novel ideas and 
it has been investigated in fMRI studies using paradigms that call for active 
generation (Abraham et al., 2012b) or passive induction (Rutter et al., 2012b; Kröger 
et al., 2012) of conceptual expansion. Few ERP studies, however, have been 
conducted thus far to assess conceptual expansion or indeed any other aspect of 
creativity. 




3.2.2 Previous ERP research on creativity 
Traditionally, EEG studies in the field of creativity research have focused on either 
amplitude or synchronization changes associated with creative performance, but 
seldom have ERP components been explored in relation to creative cognition (Arden 
et al., 2010; Dietrich & Kanso, 2010). Until recently, the only exception to this case 
were a handful of investigations on insight problem solving (Lang et al., 2006; Lavric 
et al., 2000; Luo et al., 2011; Qiu et al., 2008). 
In a recent study conducted by Rutter and colleagues (2012a), a novel and 
promising way to investigate creative thinking using ERP methods was established. 
In this study, conceptual expansion was successfully linked to the well-known N400 
component. Rutter et al. (2012a) used metaphorical statements as stimuli and 
compared creative (unusual and appropriate), nonsensical (unusual and 
inappropriate) and literal phrases (usual and appropriate) which were classified as 
such by subjects on a trial-by-trial basis. One of their findings was that the N400 and 
a late ERP component were modulated as a function of the unusualness of the 
stimuli. 
The N400 component is a well-documented ERP component which is characterized 
as a negative-going waveform between 200 and 600 ms, which peaks around 400 
ms after the critical event. It usually shows a centro-parietal distribution and a slight 
right-hemisphere bias (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). This ERP component was first 
reported as a brain response to semantically incongruent sentence endings, such as 
“He took a sip from the transmitter (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). The authors proposed 
that a higher N400 signalled an interruption of on-going sentence processing and a 
search for meaning in the sentence. Following the original discovery, several studies 
have investigated the N400 using a variety of paradigms. This ERP component is 
held to be highly relevant for indexing lexical and semantic aspects of language 
processing as well as semantic memory and recognition memory (Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011; Lau et al., 2008). 
 




3.2.3 The present study 
To investigate the link between conceptual expansion to the N400 component, this 
present study adapted a paradigm used in an fMRI study by Kröger et al. (2012) 
where conceptual expansion was induced using a modified version of the alternate 
uses task (Wallach & Kogan, 1965). The original alternate uses task requires the 
generation of as many uses as possible for common objects (e.g., a shoe) and 
thereby necessitates that the subject expands the usual conceptual boundaries in 
which the object is customarily used (e.g., foot protection) to include novel 
dimensions (e.g., plant pot, ashtray). The responses in the classic alternate uses 
task are not differentiated in terms of the degree to which they encompass the two 
defining components of creativity, which are Originality (novel, unique) and 
Appropriateness (relevant, meaningful) (Runco & Jaeger, 2012). The current 
modification of original paradigm, however, enables the concurrent consideration of 
both these components separately (originality OR appropriateness) as well as 
together (originality AND appropriateness). 
In this experimental task (Figure 1), subjects were shown word pairs consisting of an 
everyday object and a potential use for this object. Subjects had to decide on a trial-
by-trial basis whether they found the use for the given object to be unusual 
appropriate or both. 
Three different trial outcomes were possible: object use combinations rated as highly 
unusual and highly appropriate (creative uses), or highly unusual and low 
appropriate (nonsensical uses) or low unusual and highly appropriate (common 
uses). Subjects were informed that the fourth trial outcome of a no-no response (low 
unusual and low appropriate) was not possible and would not make sense because 
a low appropriate object-use combination is always highly unusual. This 
experimental design therefore allowed each trial to be individually validated by each 
participant as belonging to one of the three conditions (creative uses, nonsensical 
uses, common uses). Trials in which subjects judged a particular object use 
combination to be highly unusual and highly appropriate (creative uses) are trials in 
which conceptual expansion was passively induced. This is because subjects 
needed to loosen and expand the conceptual boundaries of the object in order to 
make a new semantic connection between the previously unrelated object-use 
concepts. 





Figure 1. Experimental trial overview: The fixation period lasted between 700 ms and 1000 ms 
(steps of 100 ms). Total trial length from fixation cross to onset of the break thus varied between 
8400 and 8700 ms. 
 
In line with the literature, we expect a modulation of the N400 as a function of the 
semantic congruence of the given object-use combination. Trials judged as low 
unusual and high appropriate (common uses) should result in a reduced N400 
amplitude as no violation of prior world knowledge occurred (Hagoort et al., 2004). 
This would be in contrast to trials judged as high unusual and low appropriate 
(nonsensical uses), which should show a strong N400 amplitude. The interesting 
case would be the N400 pattern associated with the trials judged as highly unusual 
and highly appropriate (creative uses), where conceptual expansion was induced as 
novel but fitting associations were made. On the one hand, a semantic mismatch or 
incongruence occurs as the subject is exposed to a wholly novel semantic 
association. Thus, just as in the case of the nonsensical uses, the N400 associated 
with the creative uses is expected to be significantly higher than that of the common 
uses. On the other hand, unlike the nonsensical uses, creative object use 
combinations can be successfully integrated into existing semantic networks. Rutter 
et al. (2012a) reported a graded effect in the N400 time window with the highest 




amplitude for nonsensical metaphors and more positive amplitudes for creative 
metaphors, followed by literal phrases (N400: nonsense > creative > common). 
If the N400 reflects solely semantic or world knowledge violations, we expect the 
N400 to be undifferentiated between the creative uses and nonsensical uses. 
However, if the N400 is also responsive to the successful integration of novel 
semantic association into existing knowledge structures, we expect the N400 
amplitude to be smaller in the case of creative uses compared to nonsensical uses, 
in line with the findings of Rutter et al. (2012a). 
 
3.3 Materials and Methods 
3.3.1 Participants 
Twenty-four right-handed students either received a 15 Euro payment or course 
credit for their participation in the experiment. Handedness was assessed using the 
German version of the Edinburgh Inventory of Handedness (Oldfield, 1971). Four 
subjects had to be excluded from further analysis because they did not reach the 
minimum inclusion criterion of at least 30 trials per condition (see Data Analyses 
section for further details). The final sample therefore comprised 20 native German-
speaking subjects (11 women; age range = 20-27 years, mean = 22.55, SD = 2.1) 
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of the participants had a history of 
neurological or psychiatric illness, and none were taking drugs according to self-
report. All gave written informed consent before participation. The experimental 
standards were approved by the ethics committee of the German Society of 
Psychology (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie). 
 
3.3.2 Task Design/Procedure 
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor in a separate room that was 
isolated from that of the experimenter and the computers. After applying the 
electrodes the participants were given task instructions and performed a 10-minute 
practice session on a computer with another set of stimuli. Stimuli were presented 
using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Albany, CA) and 




consisted of black letters (size = 28) on a grey background. During each trial, 
subjects viewed two consecutive words consisting of a common object (first word) 
and a described use for this object (second word). 
Each trial (see Figure 1) started with a fixation cross presented in the middle of the 
screen, lasting between 700 and 1000 ms, which was jittered in steps of 100 ms. 
After a 200 ms blank screen, the first word (common object) was shown for 1000 ms 
followed by a 500 ms blank screen and the second word (described use, further 
referred to as critical word) lasting for another 1000 ms. We chose to present the two 
words one after another to prevent any overlap between ERP components. 
Following a 1000 ms blank screen, the questions “Unusual” and “Appropriate” each 
appeared for 1500 ms, separated by a 500 ms blank screen. Subjects were asked to 
give a yes/no answer to each of these questions by pressing either the left or the 
right arrow key of a computer keyboard with the index finger and the ring finger of 
their right hand. 
Participants were instructed to decide whether they found a given object use 
combination to be unusual and/or appropriate. To prevent misunderstandings with 
what was meant with the words “unusual” and “appropriate”, they were told that a 
use was to be classified as “unusual” if it was novel or unfamiliar to them and “not 
unusual” if it was known or familiar. They were also instructed that a use was to be 
classified as “appropriate” if it was fitting or relevant and “not appropriate” if it was 
unfitting or irrelevant. Each stimulus was categorized as belonging to one of three 
possible conditions based on the participant’s response. The three possible 
conditions were: high-unusual and high-appropriate (creative uses, yes-yes 
response), high-unusual and low-appropriate (nonsensical uses, yes-no response) 
and low-unusual and high-appropriate (common uses, no-yes response). Subjects 
were also informed that a no-no response (low unusual and low appropriate) would 
not make sense as a low appropriate object-use combination is always highly 
unusual. 
After each trial, participants had the opportunity to take a break and start the next 
trial at their own pace, via button press of the up arrow key, to prevent extensive 
blinking and exhaustion. With a trial length of 10 seconds and a total of 135 trials, 
presented in a pseudo-randomized order, the experimental session lasted 
approximately 25 minutes (pauses taken by the participants not included).  





The study used a stimulus-set created for a previous fMRI study (Kröger et al., 2012) 
which was adapted to meet ERP criteria for investigating the N400 component. 45 
experimenter-determined word pairs per condition were used to ensure the high 
likelihood of there being a minimum of 30 subject-determined trials in each condition. 
Each object was used in all three experimenter-determined conditions (creative 
uses, nonsensical uses and common uses) in combination with a described use for 
this object (for examples see Table 1). Words were checked for word length and 
frequency of occurrence in the German language. A one-way ANOVA revealed that 
there were no significant differences in word length between the three experimenter-
determined conditions (F (2, 132) = 1.37; p = .26). Frequency of occurrence in the 
German language was computed using the online Vocabulary Database of the 
University of Leipzig in Germany (http://wortschatz.uni-leipzig.de/). The frequency 
classes of this database indicate the frequency of the target word in relation to the 
German definite article “der” (“the”). For example the word “der” (“the”) is 2^9 times 
more frequent than the word “Ball” (“ball”). A median test comparing the three 
conditions confirmed that they did not differ significantly regarding the frequency of 
occurrence (md = 19 for creative uses and nonsensical uses, md = 18 for common 
uses; p = .7). 
 
Table 1. Example Stimuli for all three conditions (creative uses, nonsensical uses, common uses) in 
German. English translation is added below the original stimulus. 
Condition Stimulus 
Highly unusual and highly appropriate  
(creative associations) 
Schuh -> Blumentopf 
shoe -> plant pot 
Highly unusual and low appropriate  
(nonsensical associations) 
Schuh -> Osterhase 
shoe -> Easter bunny 
Low unusual and highly appropriate  
(common associations) 
Schuh -> Kleidungsstück 
shoe -> piece of clothing 




3.3.4 ERP recording  
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 64 Ag/AgCl electrodes using 
an actiCAP system (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany) and BrainVision 
recorder software. Data was recorded using an average-reference on-line. The EEG 
signal was amplified by a QuickAmp amplifier (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, 
Germany) and sampled at 500 Hz by a 24 bit analogue-to-digital converter. 
Impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. Eye blinks and movements were recorded by 
bipolar EOG electrodes that were placed above and below the right eye, as well as 
in horizontal position next to both eyes. 
 
3.3.5 Data Analysis 
As the subjects determined which trials should be allotted to each condition (creative 
uses, nonsensical uses, common uses) with their responses, it was important to 
establish sample homogeneity using a priori inclusion criterion that ensured a 
minimum number of trials per condition across all subjects in the final sample. 
Behavioral pilot studies indicated that some variability was unavoidable when using 
subject-determined trial classifications as participants vary from one another on the 
evaluation of whether a particular object-use combination should be considered as 
unusual and appropriate. While the subject-determined trial classification is certainly 
the major strength of the current paradigm as it ensures the individual validation of 
the experimental design, it also necessitates the exclusion of all participants who did 
not meet the strict inclusion criterion of having at least 30 trials per condition. 
In order to detect significant differences in reaction times (RTs), a 3 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA was carried out, with the factors Condition (creative uses, 
nonsensical uses, common uses) and Question (Unusual, Appropriate). 
EEG data were analyzed using the Vision Analyzer 2.0 software (Brain Products 
GmbH, Gilching, Germany). Raw data were initially filtered with a 50 Hz notch and a 
0.01 Hz high-pass filter and afterwards segmented into epochs of 1150 ms duration. 
Each segment started at 150 ms before the onset of the critical word and belonged 
to one of the three possible conditions (creative uses, nonsensical uses or common 
uses) based on the participants' responses. Segments were baseline-corrected 




using the 150 ms time window before onset of the critical word. Eye blinks were 
removed using an ocular correction procedure based on the Gratton & Coles 
algorithm (Gratton et al., 1983). A 30 Hz low-pass filter with a slope of 24 db/Oct was 
applied and artefacts with amplitude exceeding +/-50 μV were removed. ERP 
waveforms were averaged for each participant and each condition. Subsequently 
grand-averaged ERPs of all participants were calculated in time windows of interest. 
An early time window (300-500 ms) and a late window (500-900 ms) were used to 
capture the N400 effect as well as any late components. This latter time window was 
chosen on the basis of a former study conducted by Rhodes and Donaldson, who 
tried to capture any continuation of an observed N400 effect (Rhodes & Donaldson, 
2008).  
For each time window, a repeated measures ANOVA was computed using the CPz 
electrode and its eight neighbouring electrodes (C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CP2, P1, Pz, P2) 
as one factor (electrodes) and the three conditions (creative uses, nonsensical uses, 
common uses) as another factor (conditions). The electrode sites were chosen on 
the background of the known centro-parietal distribution of the N400 effect (Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011) and in order to explore later ERP components following the N400, 
after visual inspection of the data. 
Pairwise Bonferroni-corrected comparisons were carried out within the repeated 
measures analysis to assess possible main and interaction effects. In all cases, 
effects sizes (Cohen’s d and partial eta squared η2) are reported along with 
significance levels. 
The Greenhouse-Geisser correction (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) was applied to 
all ERP repeated measures analyses with more than one degree of freedom 
because the assumption of sphericity was violated. Corrected p-values with the 
original degrees of freedom are reported for both ERP time windows. 
 





3.4.1 Behavioral Findings 
The mean concordance between experimenter-determined conditions and subject-
determined conditions was highest for common uses (92.8 %) followed by 
nonsensical uses (88.3 %) and creative uses (80.2 %), showing that, as expected, 
the creative uses were judged more subjectively than the other uses (p < .05).  
Table 2 shows the mean reaction times and standard deviations across all conditions 
to both questions. The repeated measures ANOVA with the factors condition 
(creative uses, nonsensical uses, common uses) and question (first question = 
unusual, second question = appropriate) revealed significant main effects for both 
the factors: condition (F (2,38) = 11.1; p < .001; partial eta squared η2 = .37) and 
question (F (1,19) = 71.4; p < .001; partial η2 = .79).  
These main effects indicate that responses to creative uses and nonsense uses 
were associated with longer reaction times than in the case of common uses and 
that responses to the first question (Unusual?) were significantly slower than 
responses to the second question (Appropriate?). A significant interaction effect 
(condition x question) between both the factors was also found 
(F (2,38) = 8.5; p = .001; partial η2 = .31). 
 
Table 2. Reaction times (Mean and Standard Deviation) for all conditions in milliseconds. 
Conditions Unusual (Question 1) Appropriate (Question 2) 
































Bonferroni-corrected (p < .05) post hoc t-tests which were conducted to explore the 
interaction effect revealed that subjects responded significantly faster to the first 
question in the common uses condition compared to the first question in the creative 




uses (p = .015; Cohen`s d = .34) and nonsensical uses conditions (p < .001; d = .62). 
Additionally, subjects responded significantly faster to the second question in the 
common uses condition compared to the second question in the creative uses 
condition (p = .027; d = .34).To further explore this interaction effect, a 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with the factors condition (creative uses, nonsensical 
uses) and question revealed that even after removing the common uses from the 
analysis a significant interaction effect remained (F (1,19) = 21.2; 
p  < .001; partial η2 = .53). This indicates that the resulting interaction is due to the 
fact that responses to the first question (unusual) were slower in nonsensical uses 
trials than in the creative uses trials, but were faster in nonsensical uses trials 
following the second question (appropriate)2. 
 
3.4.2 ERP Findings: General 
Grand average waveforms of 36 electrode sites covering the entire scalp are shown 
in Figure 2. The waveforms of single electrode sites Cz and C2 are depicted in 
Figure 3 for a closer illustration of the negative going peak around 400 ms (N400) 
after onset of the critical word. Starting at around 500 ms a positive-shift can be seen 
in all three conditions which is smaller for nonsensical uses trials compared with 
creative and common uses trials. 
The N400 differences between the conditions were such that creative uses (p = .038; 
d = 2.48) and nonsensical uses (p = .027; d = 2.61) elicited a significantly greater 
negative mean amplitude in this time window than the common uses. However, the 
N400 elicited during the processing of creative uses and nonsensical uses did not 
differ significantly from one another (p = 1; d = .18) (Figure 4). 
                                            
2
 Please note that the RT data was derived from the time taken to respond to the question 
prompts, and not the time taken to respond to the stimuli. However, as information related to 
the question prompt is assessed prior to the prompt itself, we cannot make any clear claims 
about how the RT measurements directly relate to the cognitive processes in question. We 
nonetheless include the RT-related findings in the paper as it may be of interest to 
researchers in order to understand all the peripheral factors that relate to the implementation 
of this novel ERP paradigm in the study of creative cognition. 






Figure 2. Grand-average ERPs for creative uses (green line), nonsensical uses (red line) and 
common uses (black line) on 36 electrodes. Vertical line marks onset of the critical word. Negativity is 
plotted upward.  
 
  






Figure 3. Grand average ERPs on electrode sides Cz and C2 for creative uses (solid line), 
nonsensical uses (dashed line) and common uses (dotted line). Light-gray box marks early time 
window (300 - 500ms, N400 analysis). Dark gray box marks late time window (500 - 900 ms, post-
N400). Vertical line marks onset of the critical word. Negativity is plotted upward. Timeline in 
milliseconds. 
 





Figure 4. Mean amplitudes from nine electrodes (C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz and P2) of all 
three conditions (creative uses, nonsensical uses, common uses) in early time window (300-500 ms, 
N400 effect). Error bars shown represent standard error of the mean. Significant differences ( p < .05) 
are marked with an asterisk. 
 
 
3.4.3 ERP Findings: Post-N400 late component (Time Window 500-900 ms) 
To assess potential differences between the three conditions beyond the N400 time 
window, an explorative analysis was conducted in the late time window between 500 
and 900 ms. As shown at electrode sites Cz and C2 in Figures 2 and 3, waveforms 
associated with nonsensical and creative uses begin to diverge after 500ms, with a 
greater sustained negativity for nonsensical uses but a more positive shift in case of 
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Figure 5. Mean amplitudes from nine electrodes (C1, Cz, C2, CP1, CPz, CP2, P1, Pz and P2) of all 
three conditions (creative uses, nonsensical uses, common uses) in later time window (500 -900 
ms). Error bars shown represent standard error of the mean. Significant differences ( p < .05) are 
marked with an asterisk. 
 
The repeated measures ANOVA revealed significant main effects for the factor 
electrode (F (8,152) = 31.6; p < .001; partial η2= .62) and condition (F (2,38) = 10.8;  
p = .001; partial η2 = .36) and again no significant interaction of electrodes x 
condition (F (16,304) = 1.2; p = .3; partial η2 = .06).  
Moreover, just as in the case of the N400, the difference between waves elicited by 
the nonsensical uses and common uses in the later time window continued to be 
significant (p < .001; d = 4.32). However, unlike in the case of the N400, the waves 
elicited during processing of creative uses did not differ significantly from common 
uses in the late time window (p = .3; d = 1.83). While creative uses and nonsensical 
uses were undifferentiated in their N400 response,  in the post-N400 late time 
window, the processing of creative uses led to a more positive amplitude shift 
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The aim of the current study was to investigate possible modulations of the well-
established N400 ERP component alongside later potential ERP components by the 
creative cognitive process of conceptual expansion when compared to the 
information processing of mere novelty or appropriateness. A recent ERP study 
conducted by Rutter and colleagues (2012a) was also conducted to this end. 
However, in contrast to that study, the employed stimuli in the present study were 
not metaphors but word pairs consisting of everyday objects and of a described use 
for this object within a modified alternate uses task paradigm. 
In doing so, we implemented several innovations in the investigation of creative 
thinking using EEG methods. First of all, we chose not to focus on creativity as a 
unitary entity and instead targeted one crucial mental operation of creative thinking, 
namely conceptual expansion. We also did not analyze EEG amplitude or 
synchronization changes but assessed the process of conceptual expansion with 
reference to specific time-locked ERP components. The experimental paradigm was 
designed such that each trial of the experiment had to be individually validated by 
each subject as belonging to a particular condition. Individual differences in the 
process of conceptual expansion were thus taken into account. This approach also 
allowed for the assessment of the separable effects of originality and 
appropriateness from that of creative conceptual expansion which arises from a 
combination of these factors (Kröger et al., 2012).  
 
3.5.1 Modulation of the N400  
The results clearly demonstrate that object-use pairs that were classified by the 
participants to be high unusual and low appropriate (nonsensical uses) or high 
unusual and high appropriate (creative uses) associations elicited significantly higher 
N400 amplitudes than those classified as low unusual and high appropriate 
(common uses). This fits perfectly with the N400 literature which suggests that the 
N400 is particularly responsive to semantic deviance. Moreover, the N400 amplitude 
difference between the nonsensical uses and creative uses was not significant which 
indicates that the N400 is sensitive to the levels of novelty or unusualness 




associated with the stimuli but not to differing levels of associated appropriateness of 
the conceptual combinations. This finding suggests that the mental operations in 
relation to conceptual expansion are not solely reflected in the N400 component. 
After all, the pattern of the N400 was not differentiated by the fact that although the 
creative object-use combination is semantically incongruent at first, unlike the case 
of the nonsensical object-use combination, the novel semantic association evoked 
by the creative uses can eventually be successfully integrated into one’s knowledge 
structures.  
Defining what the N400 indexes is a matter of on-going debate (Kutas & Federmeier, 
2011). While some classify the N400 as a correlate of an early prelexical stage of the 
comprehension processing stream (Deacon et al., 2000) others associate the N400 
with a later postlexical stage (Hagoort et al., 2004). The fact that the N400 is 
influenced by top-down processes as well as bottom-up processes, led to the recent 
proposal by Lotze and colleagues (2011), that the degree of matching between top-
down processes and bottom-up information is reflected in the N400 modulation, with 
a mismatch resulting in a higher N400 amplitude. In their study they were able to 
show, for example, that pure form-based information (uppercase letters) could 
attenuate the N400 effect of a critical word (Lotze et al., 2011).  
Given that the current study was not designed to test the validity of these competing 
theories, the findings of our study cannot be taken as direct support to any one of 
these theoretical formulations over another. As the N400 amplitudes were higher 
upon exposure to both the creative and nonsensical object-use combinations relative 
to the common object-use combinations in the current study, we postulate that the 
modulation seen here is likely to reflect a mismatch between expectations or world 
knowledge and the critical word. This mismatch led to comparable N400 amplitudes 
in both the nonsensical uses and creative uses condition relative to the common 
uses condition (nonsensical uses = creative uses > common uses). 
The N400 pattern shown in the current study is only partially comparable to the 
reported N400 pattern in the study of Rutter and colleagues (2012a). Although the 
reported main effects were comparable in both studies, a linear trend was also 
discovered in the Rutter et al. (2012) study which suggested a graded effect in the 
N400 time window, with the highest negative mean amplitude for nonsensical 
metaphors and less negative amplitudes for creative metaphors, both relative to 




literal phrases (N400: nonsensical > creative > common). Apart from the many 
differences in the methodological approach (stimulus material, analysed electrodes, 
subjects, statistical analysis, etc.) between the two studies, there are also critical 
differences between the cognitive demands of the two tasks used. When faced with 
the task employed in the current study, there is a higher need for inference 
generation to be able to judge whether a given object use combination is unusual 
and appropriate (e.g. creative uses: shoe → plant pot). In the study of Rutter et al. 
(2012a) the manner in which the presented concepts could be related to one another 
was far more obvious as the connection and direction of the association was 
explicitly stated within the sentence (e.g. creative phrases: The clouds wept over the 
fields). 
We can thus conclude that the manner in which the N400 is modulated in 
semantically incongruent contexts may be dependent on one or more of these subtle 
factors, which could in turn lead to discrepancies across studies in this early ERP 
time window. 
 
3.5.2 Late ERP components (Post-N400: 500 – 900 ms) 
As no significant difference was found between the amplitudes elicited by creative 
uses (conceptual expansion) and nonsensical object-use combinations in the N400 
time window, an explorative analysis was run in a post-N400 time window to 
evaluate whether any differences between these conditions would emerge, as also 
reported by Rutter and colleagues (2012a). Significant differences between the 
amplitudes of the three conditions were found in that greater positive mean 
amplitudes were associated with the processing of creative uses and common uses 
compared to nonsensical uses. Just as in the case of the N400, the nonsensical 
object-use combinations continued to elicit a stronger relative negativity in the late 
window compared to the common object-use combinations. But there was a 
fascinating switch in the amplitude pattern associated with the creative object-use 
combinations as the brain activity associated with the processing of creative uses 
was no longer significantly differentiable from that of the common uses, whereas the 
difference between the mean amplitude of creative and nonsensical uses was highly 
significant (nonsensical > creative = common).  




These findings also only partially fit with the results reported by Rutter et al. (2012a) 
in the later time window. They reported a linear trend which showed a graded effect 
(nonsensical > creative > common) with the lowest mean amplitude for nonsensical 
metaphors followed by creative metaphors, both relative to literal phrases. However, 
unlike in the present findings, the ERP waveform differences between the creative 
phrases and literal phrases was still significant (Rutter et al., 2012a).  
On the basis of the pattern of findings in the current study, we postulate that the 
relative negativity in the nonsensical uses condition results from the continued failure 
to integrate the nonsensical object-use combination into existing semantic networks, 
whereas the positive shift found in the creative uses condition (and the common 
uses condition) could be indicative of a successful semantic integration process. As 
few ERP studies have been conducted to investigate creative thinking, we refer to 
findings from other related cognitive domains to aid our interpretation of this post-
N400 effect.  
Post-N400 slow wave effects have been previously described in studies on joke 
comprehension (Coulson & Williams, 2005; Coulson & Wu, 2005), as well as 
language comprehension tasks (Baggio et al., 2008; Baggio et al., 2010; Davenport 
& Coulson, 2011; Davenport & Coulson, 2013; Pijnacker et al., 2009; Rhodes & 
Donaldson, 2008). However, such slow wave effects were often observed as 
sustained negativities (Baggio et al., 2008; Coulson & Williams, 2005; Nieuwland & 
Van Berkum, 2008; van Berkum, 2009) or as late positivities (Davenport & Coulson, 
2011; Davenport & Coulson, 2013) over frontal electrode sites. Studies that report 
slow wave effects over centro-parietal electrodes sites therefore offer a better 
comparison to the results found in the present study.  
For example, Baggio et al. (2010) reported a similar centro-parietal slow wave effect 
following the reading of sentences like: “The journalist began the article before his 
coffee break”. These sentences necessitate the reader to infer that the journalist 
started to write the article. This “silent semantic element” therefore requires 
additional cognitive computations, which were reflected in a post-N400 time window 
(500-1000 ms) in form of a sustained negative shift (Baggio et al., 2010).  
In a study by Pijnacker et al. (2010), participants had to decide whether a presented 
conditional inference was correctly drawn from a given modus ponens which was 




either preceded by a congruent or a disabling context (Pijnacker et al., 2010). A 
disabling context led to more rejections of the drawn conclusion and elicited a slow 
negative wave starting at around 250 ms after onset of the critical word and lasting 
until 1000 ms over central electrodes. The authors interpreted this slow wave 
negativity as a correlate of a “complex, inference-driven interpretive process” 
(Pijnacker et al., 2010).  
Both studies thus reported a post-N400 sustained negativity possibly reflecting 
higher cognitive demands, which is not entirely in line with the present findings as 
the post-N400 sustained negativity was found for nonsensical uses which were not 
necessarily more cognitively demanding or involved complex inference processing. 
The findings of Rhodes and Donaldson (2008) offer a better fit to the current results 
regarding the sustained negativity effect for nonsensical trials. In their experiment, 
unrelated word pairs elicited a comparable sustained negativity in a time window 
between 500 and 900 ms over left parietal electrode sites compared to word pairs 
which were either associatively or semantically related (Rhodes & Donaldson, 2008). 
The more positive amplitudes for related word pairs compared to unrelated word 
pairs were interpreted as recollection from long-term memory, possibly reflecting the 
well-known parietal old/new effect (Rugg & Curran, 2007). However, the effect in 
their study followed a left parietal distribution, whereas the effect in the present study 
showed a more right-lateralized centro-parietal distribution. 
In summary, although there aremany findings regarding post-N400 slow wave 
effects, it is still difficult to draw clear conclusions about the function of such late ERP 
components. This is because each of these studies have targeted different cognitive 
processes with different paradigms, and therefore cannot be readily aligned with one 
another. While the studies could be partly related to one another with reference to 
the nonsensical uses condition and the findings of associated sustained negativity, 
there is little comparability between the paradigms in the context of the creative uses 
condition and the underlying process of conceptual expansion. So the hypothesis 
that the post-N400 late ERP component reflects the success associated with the 
semantic integration process is one that begs further exploration.  
 




3.5.3 Conclusions and Implications  
In summary, this study successfully adapted a novel experimental fMRI paradigm 
within an EEG setting (Kröger et al., 2012) to carry out one of the first ERP 
experiments to investigate conceptual expansion as one critical aspect of creative 
thinking. In doing so we have demonstrated that well-established ERP components 
can be used to investigate the neural correlates of creative thinking when suitable 
paradigms are developed that focus on specific creative cognitive processes.  
The results of the current study, where a modified alternate uses task was used to 
assess passively induced creative conceptual expansion relative to novelty and 
appropriateness, found two ERP components to be instrumentally implicated in 
these operations: the N400 and a post-N400 late component. By relating these 
findings to those of related fields in the literature, it appears that the N400 acts like a 
semantic novelty or mismatch indicator whereas the successful integration of 
relevantly associated concepts within one’s conceptual knowledge is reflected within 
a later post-N400 time window.  
With regard to implications of the findings for the field of creative cognition, the N400 
was found to reflect the processing of novelty or unusualness as it was insensitive to 
the distinction between novelty that is contextually inappropriate (nonsensical uses) 
and novelty that is contextually appropriate (creative uses). The post-N400 late 
component, in contrast, reflected the process of appropriateness as it was 
insensitive to the distinction between appropriateness that is contextually familiar 
(common uses) and appropriateness that is contextually unfamiliar (creative uses). 
The discovery that the cognitive operations relevant to conceptual expansion are 
best captured by taking into account the influence of both the N400 time window 
(novelty or originality) AND the post-N400 late time window (reflecting 
appropriateness or fit) is a valuable one for the field of creative neurocognition. This 
is especially significant as originality (novelty/unusualness) and appropriateness 
(relevance/fit) are the two defining elements of creativity (Stein, 1953).  
Investigating the information processing of novel yet appropriate conceptual 
combinations that induce conceptual expansion in real-time within neuroscientific 
settings provide a unique avenue by which one can not only uncover the dynamics 




underlying select aspects of creative thinking, but also attain a broader 
understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying semantic cognition. 
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4 General Discussion 
Two neuroscientific studies were carried out to investigate the neuronal correlates of 
conceptual expansion processing, a core component of creative thinking. An 
innovative paradigm was successfully implemented in these two studies using a 
modified alternate uses task. The task was designed to separately asses the effects 
of the two defining elements of creative products, novelty and appropriateness, as 
well as their conjunction in the form of passively induced conceptual expansion. The 
results and conclusions of these studies will be discussed in the following sections. 
 
4.1 fMRI results 
The fMRI hypotheses could be confirmed for the most part. In accordance to the 
introduced expectations, conceptual expansion related activity was found in the 
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45, BA 47), the frontopolar cortex (BA 10) and the temporal 
poles (BA 38), predominantly in the left hemisphere. This hemispheric asymmetry is 
not surprising given the dominant role for the left hemisphere in language processing 
(Gernsbacher & Kaschak, 2003). It is also in line with previous observations in other 
creativity studies that have used verbal material (Carlsson et al., 2000; Fink et al., 
2009). 
The ecological validity of the employed paradigm could be questioned on the basis 
of whether the induction of conceptual expansion in the presented study is 
analogous to the processes that take place when actively engaging in creative 
thinking. There are two grounds on the basis of which to assert confidence about the 
findings associated with the paradigm. First, given all that is known about brain 
structure and function, it is not plausible that the brain regions involved in passive 
conceptual expansion would be wholly distinct from that of active conceptual 
expansion given that the conceptual  knowledge networks being expanded upon in 
the brain and one and the same. There would be a differential engagement of brain 
structures based on volitional aspects of the engagement, but not the semantic 
elements.  
Moreover, the findings associated with passive conceptual expansion using a 
modified alternate uses task could be corroborated by other studies. These include 




an fMRI study of passive conceptual expansion using a metaphor task (Rutter et al., 
2012b) and an fMRI study of active conceptual expansion using a standard alternate 
uses task (Abraham et al., 2012b)  
Rutter and colleagues conducted a very similar paradigm to the one reported here 
but used metaphors instead of everyday objects. They reported passive conceptual 
expansion related activation in predominantly left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45, BA 
47), the middle temporal gyrus (BA 20, BA 21), temporal poles (B 38) and frontopolar 
cortex (BA 10). A shortcoming common to both the Rutter et al study and the current 
study was that it could be argued that the results could potentially reflect that 
conceptual expansion processing is cognitive more demanding than pure novelty or 
appropriateness processing. However, the fact that similar findings were 
demonstrated in a fMRI study of Abraham et al. (2012b) in which an active 
conceptual expansion task was implemented while also controlling for cognitive 
demand speak against this critique.  
In the Abraham et al. study, subjects had to execute four different tasks, two 
regarding divergent thinking (alternate uses: generate as many uses as you can for a 
given object; object location task: generate as many objects as you can for a given 
location) and two n-back tasks (1-back:? and 2-back:?). Conceptual expansion 
(inclusive mask analysis: contrast of alternate uses > object location task with 
inclusive mask of alternate uses > 2-back task) related activation was found in left 
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45, BA 47), lateral frontopolar cortex (BA 10) and temporal 
poles (BA 38). Thus, the further interpretations now have a broader empirical basis. 
The observed activation in the frontopolar cortex (BA 10) fits well in its mentioned 
role in processing of tasks in which multiple relations have to be integrated and 
considered simultaneously (Green et al., 2010; Kroger et al., 2002; Bunge et al., 
2005), like, for instance, in the Raven's Progressive Matrices test (Christoff et al., 
2001). Badre (2008) suggested a hierarchical organization of the prefrontal cortex, 
with the frontopolar cortex involved in the highest level of abstract thinking. In terms 
of conceptual expansion, the activation in the frontopolar cortex is assumed to reflect 
the cognitive demand to integrate the new related concepts into an expanded 
concept.  
This interpretation is supported by recent findings of Green and colleagues (2012), 
who found frontopolar activation in relation to creative analogical mapping. This 




study is also remarkable, as it bridged the gap between “normative” cognition (in the 
form of analogical thinking) and creative thinking. Green (2014) also conducted a 
recent fMRI study using a “thin-slice creativity verb generation task” (Green et al., 
2014; Prabhakaran et al., 2014), a task in which subjects have to name a verb after 
seeing a prompted noun. Subjects are further supposed to either name any verb 
(uncued condition) or to “think creatively when generating a verb response” (cued 
condition). Verbs generated during “creative states” tended to show as expected a 
greater semantic distance to the prompted noun. Frontopolar cortex was significantly 
recruited during these creative states, as well as bilateral inferior frontal gyrus and 
the anterior cingulate cortex. An increase in functional connectivity between 
frontopolar cortex and ACC could also be observed. The ACC activation was 
interpreted as the inhibition demand regarding conflicting response possibilities. This 
finding is in line with the finding of ACC involvement in the reported fMRI study of 
this doctoral thesis and the aforementioned fMRI study by Abraham and colleagues 
(2012b). 
As stated in the hypotheses (section 1.6.2), activations in inferior frontal gyrus und 
temporal poles were expected to reflect higher search demands in semantic 
networks both in creative uses trials as well as nonsensical uses trials. These 
hypotheses were only confirmed for the creative uses, but not for nonsensical uses. 
This divergence is interesting because other studies have shown that the left inferior 
frontal gyrus is more strongly activated during processing of associative weakly 
related concepts (Bunge et al., 2005). However, the interpretation of the present 
findings were that as the search process within semantic networks during 
nonsensical trials could be aborted quickly due to the fundamental inability to 
integrate the new information to existing conceptual structures, the overall search 
and selection demand was lower than in the creative uses trials. The observed 
activations in anterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47) and mid-ventrolateral 
prefrontal cortex (BA 45) in the present study could be interpreted as reflecting 
controlled semantic retrieval (BA 47) and post-retrieval selection between competing 
representations (BA 45) as proposed by Badre et al. (2007). 
A candidate brain region for pure novelty processing could be the left supramarginal 
gyrus (BA 40). The supramarginal gyrus has been reported to be active as a function 
of creativity in several studies (Bechtereva et al., 2004; Fink et al., 2010). However, 




these studies did not explicitly account for the appropriateness factor of creative 
ideas. In a recent fMRI study on the other hand, Benedek and colleagues (2013) 
reported that this region was found to be activated during generation of novel ideas 
in contrast to old ideas. Taken together there is some evidence, that certain task 
constraints (appropriateness required by task or subjective adopted) lead to a 
stronger recruitment of inferior frontal gyrus during divergent thinking tasks related to 
controlled semantic search (Abraham et al., 2012b; Benedek et al., 2013). With less 
demanding constraints (high original and low appropriate), the supramarginal gyrus 
seems to be activated. This hypothesis should be addressed by future investigations. 
Brain activity exclusive to appropriateness was found in the medial frontal gyrus (BA 
9), middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and angular gyrus (BA 39). The middle temporal 
gyrus was also reported in the study by Rutter et al. (2012b) to be engaged as a 
function of appropriateness. This region is known to be involved in processing of 
semantic knowledge (Mahon & Caramazza, 2009). Furthermore, a meta-analysis by 
Wang and colleagues (2010) revealed that the left inferior frontal gyrus and the left 
middle temporal gyrus were core structures in the processing of abstract (inferior 
frontal gyrus) compared to concrete concepts (middle temporal gyrus). Bokde et al. 
(2001) also reported a functional connectivity between left inferior frontal gyrus and 
middle temporal gyrus among other occipitotemporal and temporal areas for the 
access of appropriate semantic representations. In their two-process model, Bader 
et al. (2005) suggested, that the functions of left inferior frontal gyrus and left middle 
temporal gyrus could be the bottom-up driven automatic semantic retrieval (middle 
temporal gyrus) versus a top-down controlled semantic retrieval and selection 
function (inferior frontal gyrus). The findings of the present fMRI study support this 
hypothesis.  
The posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31) and parts of the frontomedian wall (BA 9, BA 
32) have previously been shown to play a role in declarative memory retrieval 
(Abraham et al., 2008). The medial PFC was also found to be activated during the 
retrieval of information congruent to prior knowledge (van Kesteren et al., 2010). 
These brain regions also belong to the so called “default mode network”, a network 
of areas known to be activated during self-referential thinking (Abraham & von 
Cramon, 2009; Abraham, 2013b), which is fitting with the idea that trials subjectively 
classified as appropriate had more personal relevance than trials rated as 




nonsensical. The default mode network has also been discussed with regard to 
creative thinking lately (Beaty et al., 2014b; Jung et al., 2013). A study conducted by 
Beaty and colleagues (2014b) for example demonstrated an association of increased 
functional connectivity between left inferior frontal gyrus and the default mode 
network with higher divergent thinking abilities. However, the dynamics of this 
relationship needs to be the subject of further empirical investigations. 
Taken together, this new fMRI paradigm successfully assessed the brain structures 
involved in the processing of novelty, appropriateness and passive conceptual 
expansion (the conjunction of novelty and appropriateness). The findings strongly 
paralleled those of other fMRI studies that used an alternative passive conceptual 
paradigm to assess the same components (Rutter et al., 2012b) as well as an active 
conceptual expansion paradigm . This consistency across studies using different 
paradigms to assess the process of conceptual expansion speaks for the reliability 
and validity of the associated findings. 
 
4.2 ERP results 
Due to a striking lack of ERP studies on creative thinking, the discussion of the 
findings from the ERP study, that was conducted within this doctoral project, cannot 
be as detailed as the discussion of the fMRI findings. The ERP study was therefore 
far more explorative in nature than the fMRI study. 
During the conceptualization of this study it was unclear whether the information 
processing that accompanied passive conceptual expansion would be reflected in 
the N400 time window or whether the expansion of a prior concept and the 
consequent integration of this new conceptual element into the existing semantic 
network would need a longer processing time. The results demonstrated that there 
was no significant difference between the neural signature when processing creative 
uses and nonsense uses in the N400 time window as both were comparably higher 
than that of common uses. Thus the N400 reflected novelty processing in terms of 
registering the mismatch between prior knowledge and the presented stimuli. There 
was a switch in the pattern of results in the post-N400 time window (500 – 900 
milliseconds after the presentation of the stimuli), such that the results demonstrated 




no significant difference between the neural signature when processing creative and 
common uses as both were comparably lower than that of nonsense uses. Thus the 
post-N400 component reflected appropriateness processing in terms of the 
recognition and assimilation of the fit of the presented information with existing 
knowledge.  
This indicates that both the N400 and the post-N400 ERP components have to be 
jointly considered to account for the information processing involved during passive 
conceptual expansion as the N400 reflects the registering of originality in the object-
use combination while the post-N400 component reflects the registering of relevance 
in the object-use combination.  
These results were partially consistent with another ERP study conducted by Rutter 
and colleagues (2012a) who also used a passive conceptual expansion paradigm 
but, as in their fMRI study (Rutter et al., 2012b), used metaphors instead of object 
uses. They reported significant effects related to passive conceptual expansion in 
both the N400 as well as the post-N400 period. Rutter et al (2012a) found a graded 
effect in the N400 time window such that, relative to literal phrases, nonsense 
metaphors were associated with the highest N400 amplitude and creative metaphors 
associated with a medium N400 amplitude. This graded effect was not observed in 
the current ERP study using the modified alternate uses task. Rutter et al. (2012a) 
also reported a continuation of this graded effect observed in the N400 time window 
in a post-N400 time window (500 to 900ms). So, while these findings also indicate 
that both the N400 and the post-N400 ERP components have to be jointly 
considered to account for the information processing involved during passive 
conceptual expansion, the pattern of the findings is not entirely comparable to that of 
the present study.  
It is very valuable to have a situation where two different paradigms (metaphor, 
alternate uses) with the same variables of interest (novelty, appropriateness, 
creative) were developed to assess information processing related to passive 
conceptual expansion. Given the overlapping conceptual rationale behind the 
paradigms, the differences in the findings can be largely attributed to the different 
stimulus material which may have resulted in differential demands on the cognitive 
operations that are called upon to meet the different task demands. When viewing 
the differences from a conceptual standpoint, the metaphor processing task in the 




Rutter et al. study (2012a) may have required less inferential reasoning as the 
manner in which concepts had to be connected to each other was clearly spelt out. 
This could be one reason why the conceptual expansion processing was faster and, 
as a consequence, observed earlier than in the present study. Other differences 
between the studies include differences in aspects of the data analysis (e.g., choice 
of electrodes) as well as trial events(e.g., timing).  
Some notable caveats in the literature need to be acknowledged here.  First, a 
sustained negativity during novelty processing is not entirely in line with other studies 
that have reported a sustained negativity in a post-N400 time window reflecting 
some kind of higher cognitive demand (Baggio et al., 2010; Pijnacker et al., 2010). 
Rhodes and Donaldson (2008), however, reported a similar post-N400 sustained 
negativity for unrelated words compared to associatively or semantically related 
words. Second, unlike the site of focus in the present ERP study, slow-wave 
positivities after the N400 are often reported over frontal electrode sites (Davenport 
& Coulson, 2011; Davenport & Coulson, 2013; Thornhill & Van Petten, 2012) and 
therefore do not share a common interpretation with the present findings. Future 
research is therefore necessary to further investigate the underlying processes of 
such slow wave positivities over centro-parietal electrode sites. 
In summary, a new approach of investigating passive conceptual expansion with 
ERP methods was successfully implemented and resulted in findings that 
conceptually corresponded that of with another ERP study where the same rationale 
was followed. With this innovative approach, a novel direction in the investigation of 
creative thinking using traditional electrophysiological methods was made, and these 
can complement the EEG investigations on synchrony changes in brain activity 
during creative thinking. 
 
4.3 Future perspectives 
The aim of this section is to expand the presented work towards more abstract 
theoretical considerations which can lead to more informed future perspectives in the 
area of creativity research. Looking back at both the older and more recent work 
done in the field of creativity research, it is noteworthy that a great abundance of 
terms describing similar or the same issues were generated in the past 60 years, as 




many researchers have described similar processes or combinations of previously 
described processes with different terminology.  
One example is the aforementioned terms “primary and secondary process 
cognition” used by Kris (1952) versus the terms “deliberate mode” and the 
“spontaneous mode” used by Dietrich (2004) which essentially refer to the same 
phenomenon. One possible reason for this is that it is due to the wish of some 
researchers to have some kind of unique theoretical formulations to be able to 
identify their views as being separate from others. In this manner though, a 
substantial amount of redundancy is created which impedes the integration of 
research findings into a general theoretical framework. It is like a forest of terms in 
which it is likely not to see the wood for the trees. In the future, further merging of 
terms belonging to creative cognition or “normative cognition” is likely to occur, which 
will render the situation even more complicated. One recent example for this trend is 
the merging of analogical thinking (analogical mapping) and creative associative 
thinking (e.g., connecting of remote associations) as described in the studies of 
Green and colleagues (Green et al., 2012). The question is, whether different terms 
are separable from each other on a neurophysiological basis or whether the 
differentiation is merely of linguistic nature? The term “conceptual expansion” is no 
exception of the described tendency of “term abundance”. The fMRI results clearly 
supported the idea, that conceptual expansion is not a single cognitive process but 
instead comprises different processes like semantic retrieval, inhibition, mapping (or 
analogical thinking) etc., as different brain structures reflecting sub-processes of 
conceptual expansion were found to be activated. An overview of proposed sub-
processes that could play a role during passive conceptual expansion based on the 
found activations in the presented fMRI study is given in Figure 1. 
 




















In order to attain a better understanding of previous research findings, it would be 
necessary as a first step to sort the different studies on the basis of the explicitly or 
implicitly measured sub-processes. Such attempts would certainly necessitate 
developing some objective methodically consensus about the way to decide how 
different terms like, for instance “mapping” or “analogy”, relate to each other.  
The second step would involve the meta-analytical investigation of common brain 
areas that underlie the now pre-specified sub-processes from step one. Vartanian 
and colleagues (2012) undertook an interesting step toward such a project. They 
argued that the high meta-analytical inconsistency of creativity research results 
reported by Dietrich & Kanso (2010) as well as Arden et al. (2010) was due to a 
merging of very different creativity processes. They then tested the hypothesis that a 
meta-analytic focus on specific processes like analogy and metaphor processing 
would result in more consistent and dissociable results. Indeed the authors could 
confirm this assumption by demonstrating that analogy processing consistently 
recruited brain regions in the rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 10, BA 47) and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9, BA 46), whereas metaphor processing activated 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9, BA 46), temporal pole (BA 38) and cingulate 
gyrus (BA 24, 32). What the authors did not undertake, however, was to describe 
how analogy or metaphor processing is related to the more fundamental processes 
described earlier. Benedek and colleagues, for example, attempted to break creative 
thinking down into the underlying involvement of executive functions like updating, 
inhibition and shifting (Benedek et al., 2014). Thus, there is clear trend to further 
disentangle creative thinking.  
A third, and perhaps most important, step which could certainly be facilitated by 
steps one and two, would be to integrate these findings into a general theoretical 
framework, as the empirical research on creativity has progressed much faster than 
the theoretical domain in the last 15 years. So one should take a pause and 
summarize findings from previous neuroscientific creativity research and most 
importantly neuroscientific findings from other cognitive areas into a common 
theoretical framework from which one could guide further empirical research. A 
general theoretical framework could certainly build up on previous existing 
theoretical considerations. One such framework could for example be based on the 
recurrent suggestion of a two-process-model of creative thinking (Kris, 1952; Finke 




et al., 1992), which has become a modern trend again in the last years (Dietrich, 
2004) and especially more recently (Mok, 2014; Beaty et al., 2014a; Mayseless et 
al., 2014; Sowden et al., 2014). To further demonstrate this recurrence and the 
aforementioned claim of an abundance of terms, table 1 gives an incomplete 
overview of some terms and conceptions of different two-process models.  
 
Table 1. Two process models of creative thinking. 
Primary process cognition 
 
Secondary process cognition Kris (1950) 
Deliberate mode               
            
Spontaneous mode                                                        Dietrich (2004) 
Evaluation 
 
Generation Smith , Mayseless, Sowden (all 2014) 
Focused attention 
 
Defocused attention Sensu Martindale (1995) 
Selective retention 
 
Blind variation Campbell (1960), Jung (2013)  
Controlled processing 
 
Spontaneous  processing Mok (2014) 
Executive processes 
 
Associative processes Beaty (2014) 
 
As can be shown, there is a remarkable intersection suggesting one processing 
mode characterized by high cognitive control, evaluation and focused attention 
relative to a second mode comprising, generation, free-association, defocused 
attention and low cognitive control. Following the logic of this idea, divergent thinking 
as well as conceptual expansion would result from an interplay or shifting between 
these two processing modes and thus result in activation of brain areas needed for 
control, evaluation, and so on (prefrontal areas), as well as widespread search 
processes, generation, and the like (TOP areas). The idea of two-process models is 
not specific for creative thinking as it has also been employed in normative cognition 
for a long time (Sowden et al., 2014)   
Taken together, this section provided an outlook on recent and future research and 
theoretical trends in the neuroscience of creative thinking, and tried to integrate the 




reported findings of this doctoral thesis from the point of view of such upcoming 
trends. 
 
5 Conclusion  
The reported studies demonstrated a new and promising way to investigate aspects 
of creative thinking using neuroscientific methods. A new paradigm was developed 
that focused on conceptual expansion, a critical aspect of creativity. The studies 
were highly insightful about the brain basis of this mental operation that were in line 
with a priori hypotheses and have proved to be consistent, as they have been 
affirmed in other studies using alternative paradigms. It also further supported the 
idea that creative thinking is based on normative cognitive processes. 
The sixty-four years of creativity research that have elapsed since Guilford gave his 
presidential Address to the American Psychological Association have brought many 
progress and development to our understanding of this complex ability. Today the 
consensus between creativity experts is that the most urgent next step is to integrate 
the numerous findings into a coherent theoretical framework. 
The fact that creative thinking is based on normative cognitive processes 
emphasizes the need for a close collaboration between creativity researchers and 
researchers from other cognitive domains in order to assimilate the myriad findings 
to build a common neurocognitive framework of creative thinking. 
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